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X 
A study of the probability density function of a hardware performance param- 
eter delivered by a contractor to a specification is presented. Because sufficient 
data were not available to estimate this probability density function experi- 
mentally, it was necessary to derive a priori probability density functions from 
assumed axioms determined from an investigation of contractor motivation and 
behavior. From these axioms, the problem was formulated and solved in the 
form of a calculus of variations problem with integral and inequality constraints. 
Numerous examples are presented in which various strategies of contractor 
manipulation were used. The conclusions based on these examples are that 
incentive contracting is not an effective tool, and that close surveillance of the 
contractor is the most effective means for obtaining a hardware parameter to a 
specification. 
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The Probability Density Function of: a 
Hardware Performance Parameter 
1. Introduction 
This report is a part of a continuing program for 
determining and specifying system-performance margin 
relating to telecommunication system methodologj re- 
search. The first article written on this subject (Ref. 1) 
concerns a study of the criteria for acceptance of a 
system design. Essentially, that analysis furthered the 
answer to the question: Before investing more in the 
determination of the tolerances and their probability 
density functions, what would we do with them if we had 
them? To answer that question, dummy probability 
density functions were adequate for the demonstration. 
This analysis concerns itself with the question: What are 
the probability density functions? In particular, only the 
aspect of the probability density functions for hardware 
performance parameters delivered by a contractor to a 
specification along with methods of manipulating the 
contractor to obtain satisfactory probability density func- 
tions are considered. 
One of the assumptions used in the referenced analysis 
was that the tolerances were independent. While de- 
pendency could be factored into the analysis with some 
difficulty, dependency was not thought to be prevalent 
enough to be of immediate concern. In the review pro- 
cess, attention was focused on the fact that the mode of 
obtaining hardware for the telecommunications system 
for the Mariner VI and VII spacecraft was different from 
that of previous spacecraft programs. Previously, the 
system was obtained by purchasing subsystems from 
numerous contractors; this method yielded essentially 
independent parameters. For Mariners VI and VII, how- 
ever, the telecommunication system was obtained from 
one major contractor. This latter mode will probably be 
used in the future. One concern is that if the contractor 
does a poor job in one area, it is likely he will do a poor 
job in all areas, thus the dependency. Since the success 
of the mission depends largely on the contractor, it is 
quite important to understand how he will deliver to a 
specification under various influences and how to manipu- 
late the contractor to match one’s needs. 
Probability density functions are either derived or 
estimated experimentally. In determining which method 
should be selected, one must realize that adequate data 
on parameters for the spacecraft part of the telecom- 
munication system for the experimental determination 
of a parameter probability density function delivered to 
a specification is difEcult to accomplish because of the 
small number of items delivered to any one design. It 
appears uncanny, nevertheless, how biased the delivery 
is toward the low performance side. Without adequate 
data (and if a probability density function is definitely 
wanted) the only recourse appears to be to derive a priori 
probability density functions. The objective of the re- 
mainder of this analysis, therefore, is to determine the 
a priori probability density function of a hardware 
parameter delivered by a contractor to a specification 
and to determine strategies for the manipulation of the 
contractor to obtain satisfactory probability density 
functions. 
The analysis begins with the realization that the con- 
tractor acts to enhance his own self-interests and that 
these interests vary widely among contractors. A major 
part of the discussion is concerned with the determina- 
tion of these self-interests and the behavior of the con- 
tractor. While all those that were evident are discussed 
individually, self-interests were found to fall into the 
following broad categories: (1) those that basically do 
not change but are only selectable among the contractors 
in the precontract stage and (2) those that can be 
changed or manipulated after the contract is entered. 
The amount of resources necessary to make a specified 
change under the second category is influenced by the 
contractor selection made under the first category. 
Next, a short discussion as to the random state of 
nature, which is an “unintelligent adversary,” is offered. 
Of course, without the random state of nature, there is 
no problem to be solved. 
The assumption is made that the discussion describes 
a game between two players who also have an unintel- 
ligent adversary. From this assumption, an attempt is 
made to determine the rules under which they were 
playing. With this foundation, a formal statement of the 
problem is possible in a more or less axiomatic approach. 
With these rules, it is possible to infer other conclusions 
not obvious from the description of the observed play. 
Once this formulation is accepted, the solution of the 
problem is undertaken. Solving the problem involves 
the determination of appropriate net payoff functions 
for the contractor and the use of the calculus of varia- 
tions with integral and inequality constraints. To solve 
the problem, new techniques were developed; however, 
equivalent techniques developed by Koopman were 
found later (Ref. 2). This equivalence is demonstrated. 
After the methodology is developed, numerous ex- 
amples are given using both isolated and mixed strategies 
for manipulation of the contractor. These strategies are 
parameterized for various incentive-to-cost ratios. The 
general conclusion reached from the analysis and con- 
trived examples is that there is a definite lack of sensi- 
tivity to the controllable parameters for effective influence 
over the resultant probability density functions. In an 
isolated strategy of incentive contracting, the prize of- 
fered must be overwhelming to have any pronounced 
effect for the stated objective. If mixed strategies are 
used with a fixed resource for incentives, none of the 
strategies is likely to yield any pronounced effect for 
the stated objective. Although the sensitivity of the con- 
trollable parameters is relatively the same, the isolated 
strategy of surveillance was found to be the most effec- 
tive strategy to meet the stated objective. No effective 
substitutes were found by the analysis for the following 
rules for controlling the probability density functions of 
a hardware performance parameter delivered by a con- 
tractor to a specification: 
(1) Know your contractors and know them well. 
(2) Maintain very close surveillance over your con- 
tractors. 
11. Discussion of Contractor Motivation 
At the outset, a fundamental assumption made is that 
a contractor will act to enhance his own self-interests 
within some ethical framework. With this assumption, it 
is then necessary for the administrator to determine 
those self-interests or motivators if he is to get the most 
from a contractor or to manipulate the contractor. It is 
that purpose to which attention is now directed. (In this 
report, administrator is defined as the organization for 
whom work is performed, and contractor is the organiza- 
tion that performs the work.) 
Since a contractor cannot exist long in the business 
world without profit, one would be inclined to believe 
that profit is the universal motivator. While this assump- 
tion is tolerable and is quite prevalent in system con- 
tracting as evidenced by the frequent use of incentive 
type contracts, this tactic is certainly not universally 
successful. This suggests that profit is not the sole moti- 
vator for good performance but is merely one of many 
factors influencing contractor behavior in executing his 
role as a system contractor. 
In addition to profit, there are other common organi- 
zational objectives that are considered important to 
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system contractors, The objectives include growth of 
sales and employment, organization survival, technical 
gain, reputation, freedom from harassment, advance- 
ment of science and technology, and the desire for pub- 
lic approbation. Institutions, however, do not truly have 
objectives because, in reality, their objectives are the 
aggregate of the individuals’ objectives who make up an 
organization. Individuals may be manipulated, and the 
institution is only manipulated through them. The more 
closely motivation is related to the individuals, the more 
realistic this study of motivation will be. 
To study motivation more closely, a survey was made 
of literature (Refs. 3 and 4), and numerous discussions 
were held with experienced people, both at JPL and in 
industry. The factors identified as influences of motiva- 
tion are listed below (not necessarily in order of im- 
portance) : 
(1) Interests and personal background of the princi- 
(2) Survival of the principals. 
(3) Profit. 
(4) Size of the contractor. 
(5) Size of the contract. 
(6) Relative size of the contract in relation to the con- 
tractor’s business. 
(7) Age of the contractor. 
(8) Ancillary profits (such as developed technology). 
(9) Condition of the business climate. 
pals. 
(10) Glamour of the work. 
These factors are discussed in greater detail in suc- 
ceeding paragraphs. 
A. Interests and Personal Background of the Principals 
A significant factor in the motivation of a contractor is 
the interests and personal background of its top man- 
agement. Organizations frequently take on a character 
reflecting these interests and backgrounds. For example, 
a top manager who has attained his current position 
through significant experience in marketing is likely to 
be profit oriented but is conscious of a need to maintain 
long-term sales prospects. However, a top manager who 
has had significant experience through the financial con- 
trol of the business would probably hold higher value 
in the monthly profit and loss statement and, therefore, 
pursue an immediate accounting profit. Although both 
managers are relatively profit oriented, each would see 
the needs for performance on a contract differently. 
A research oriented manager might essentially “buy 
in” on a contract and sacrifice profit for an interesting 
research contract. In such a case, profit is only a means 
to an end. There are some instances where companies 
maintain entire divisions that are a dissipation for the 
interests of the principals even at no profit or some loss. 
On a smaller scale, some companies have found certain 
activities to be unprofitable but maintain them at a 
certain level as the price they must pay to maintain a 
staff capable of doing other profitable work. 
Some motives can be of an altruistic nature. For in- 
stance, some executives have a strong feeling for public 
and social services and place high priority to this end. 
The recent job training program conducted through pri- 
vate enterprise in California aimed at helping minority 
groups and other underprivileged people in obtaining 
better job opportunities is but one of the examples. 
There are others who believe in creating useful work for 
people. Companies under management of these execu- 
tives are inclined to emphasize growth and security in 
employment policy and are likely to actively and con- 
stantly participate in new product development. Yet 
there are others who have a strong desire to create new 
devices for labor-saving and personal enjoyment purposes. 
The preamble of this motive is to help improve tech- 
nology, life, and as a consequence, living standards for 
all people. It is conceivable that many household and 
office labor-saving equipment and recreational gadgetry 
were brought about in this manner. 
Although the above motives appear to be in direct 
conflict with the desire of achieving an immediate ac- 
counting profit, it is clear that those companies sponsor- 
ing programs of this nature will ultimately reap financial 
gains if the programs are conducted successfully. To 
exploit this motive for contractor performance, however, 
it is important to recognize that the actions of the con- 
tractor are restricted by the resources of the organization 
and the generosity of its principals. 
B. Survival of the Principals 
When a firm takes on the form of proprietorship or 
partnership, organization survival and the survival of 
the principals are essentially one and the same thing. 
For a corporation, however, these terms may assume an 
entirely different meaning. After a series of financial 
and technical blunders, while a corporation may have 
sufficient resources to survive, the top management team 
responsible for those mistakes is almost certain to be 
replaced. For this reason, the principals tend to be more 
conscious of their own survival with the corporation. 
The performance of a contract and the subsequent 
profit or loss are impersonal things that generally cannot 
be attributed to any one individual. However, the deci- 
sion process in conducting the project can be identified 
with spec& people, and this puts the individual’s se- 
curity in jeopardy. 
Survival within an organization is increasingly difFi- 
cult for the members of top management. Not only is 
there less flexibility in the position and greater responsi- 
bility in crucial decision making, but also there is con- 
tinual challenge from below to assume that position. It 
seems reasonable to believe that the desire of job sur- 
vival is directly related to the ranking of the job position. 
Of course, the principals can find other opportunities 
elsewhere if they are hard-pressed in maintaining their 
current position. However, this alternative can only be 
considered as a defensive weapon for those in the higher 
managerial ranks as it is not an easy task to achieve the 
desired status and remuneration on short notice. A good 
record of successful project management is mandatory if 
misunderstanding, embarrassment and harassment are to 
be avoided. The principals are highly responsive to being 
identsed with any of these; therefore, close surveillance 
of the principals is a very effective tool for contract 
control. As illustrated in Fig. 1, surveillance can be 
effective at all organizational levels. 
C. Profit 
Profit is the most immediate reward in performing a 
job and probably is the least common denominator for 
the measure of success of a contractor. To a certain 
extent, profit permeates throughout a company as a 
motivator. However, it is unreasonable to assume that 
all employees at various levels (or for that matter, all 
organizations) take the same degree of interest in profits. 
For example, the sole proprietor of a firm might take 
more interest in profits than would any other individual 
HIGH PROFIT EMPHASIS 
PRIDE OF ACHl EVEMENT 
I I I I I 
LEVEL LEVEL MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT 
WORK1 N G  SUPERVISORY MIDDLE TOP CORPORATE 
POSITION OF INDIVIDUAL IN ORGANIZATION 
Fig. 1. Relative effect of various factors on motivation vs position of individual in organization 
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or group of individuals within the firm. When a com- 
pany takes the more impersonal character of a corpora- 
tion, the principals rarely list profits as their primary 
motivation or use it as the principal determinant of busi- 
ness action. Many corporation officials have expressed 
preference for other corporate objectives such as repu- 
tation and future growth over immediate profits. 
The motivation of profit influences the individual less 
at the lower levels of an organization and the success 
of a motivation of profit strategy at each level depends 
distinctly upon the emphasis placed there by the top 
management (Fig. 1). Usually the emphasis on profits 
at the lower levels is nil as the company becomes amor- 
phous with increasing size. Success of an incentive type 
of contract depends closely on this emphasis. 
If the critical parameters of a contract depend heavily 
on the efforts at the working level, where profits are not 
a direct motivator, they may motivate in a negative 
sense by the emphasis placed on the performance by the 
management where profit is a higher motivator. 
D. Size of the Contractor 
Size of the contractor has a distinct influence on the 
performance of a contract with a parameter specification. 
Although distinctly limited in the tasks that can be per- 
formed, a small company emerging in the business world 
cannot survive far beyond their current job if it repre- 
sents a sizable portion of their business, unless their 
response is satisfactory enough to create future business. 
In this circumstance, satisfaction of specification and 
delivery are paramount motives of the company. Because 
of this, the attention given by the principals of the com- 
pany is direct and timely. 
On the other hand, the pressure of corporate survival 
on a large firm with multi-program capability is less 
intense. The performance of a relatively small contract 
often receives insufficient managerial attention. This un- 
concerned attitude may change, however, if successful 
completion of this contract may lead to substantial pro- 
duction effort, or if the contract is performed in an 
unfavorable business climate. 
E. Size of the Contract 
The size of contract has an important impact on the 
behavior of contractors that is not directly related to 
profits. Assuming that one is considering a new system 
development contract, the larger the size of the contract, 
the larger is the size and scope of the system under 
consideration. In practice, large systems generally re- 
quire numerous definitions and specifications of param- 
eters in a time scale that is unreasonable to accomplish 
with an adequate degree of accuracy. Since the con- 
tractor realizes that this is the usual circumstance and 
is conditioned to this from previous experiences, many 
specifications are taken only as a guide or design target 
instead of a set of concrete design goals. If, during the 
performance of the contract, these prove to be easily 
attained, the adequacy of the specification is rarely ques- 
tioned; on the other hand, if difficulty is encountered in 
attaining the specification, the contractor would likely 
bring this up for renegotiation on the ground that such 
targets were questionably determined. If a subsequent 
sensitivity study indicates that the specScation is indeed 
too strenuous, the contractor is relieved of his obligation. 
The conditioning caused by the frequency of this situation 
creates an attitude among contractors that makes attain- 
ment of seriously submitted specifications difEcult be- 
cause of the lack of proper attention and planning on 
the part of the contractor. 
F. Size of the Contract in Relation to the 
Contractor's Business 
Size of the contract in relation to the size of the 
contractor can create thresholds in effectiveness of in- 
centives. Although small contracts contribute heavily to 
the growth and survival of a company, small contracts 
in a relative sense probably will be handled in a routine 
manner. If a difficult specification exists in a contract 
that is in this category, an incentive award approach 
that tends to upgrade the critical parameters is usually 
ineffective. The reason for this is that if the contract is 
small, the proportionate fee probably will be so insig- 
nificant compared to the total sales volume of the com- 
pany that it is not worth diverting management attention 
to pursue the incentive fee. 
G. Age  of the Contractor 
The length of time that a company has been in 
existence can be both detrimental and beneficial. If time 
has not made the organization sedentary, age can provide 
an institutional pride for which there is motivation to 
maintain. This pride can be nurtured and taken advan- 
tage of during the execution of the contract. 
H. Ancillary Profits 
Many instances exist of companies that maintain 
divisions that are not chartered to show a direct monetary 
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profit. Profits are expected to be reaped indirectly later 
from (1) developed technology, (2) acquisition of new 
procedures, and (3) training of personnel. Monetary 
incentives obviously will not influence the performance, 
and other incentives must be sought. 
In the case of contracts with the government, ancillary 
profits may also be expected to be gained through low 
investment and risk associated with the use of govern- 
ment furnished equipment. Where this equipment is 
constructed near the contractor’s facilities, subsequent 
contracts are almost automatic and give an advantage 
over competition. 
i .  Business Climate 
The current business climate has a marked effect on 
the type of companies competing for contracts and the 
response given to the contracts. To elucidate, under a 
favorable business environment when large contracts are 
available, smaller contracts become a distraction to 
the large organizations; and they would rather not pursue 
them. In this circumstance, the small jobs will go to the 
small organizations unchallenged. This affects the re- 
sponse given to the contract because of less dependence 
on the contract to survive and because of the more 
restricted talents available. On the other hand, during a 
declining business cycle when contracts become difficult 
to obtain, the large organizations will suddenly show 
interest in any contract, irrespective of size, in an attempt 
to hold their development teams together. In many 
instances, they challenge and often successfully wrest 
jobs from the smaller companies. This is because the 
resources (money and talent) behind the larger firm can 
better prepare the proposals, which may be a sizable 
investment to a small firm, and can better cope with 
difficult situations, technical or otherwise. 
J. Glamour of the Work 
Glamour of the work definitely is a motivator that 
affects the performance of a contract. Space work, 
Hoover Dams, Panama Canals, ICBMs, atomic sub- 
marines, transcontinental railways, etc., all in their time 
were tremendous motivators. Even their mundane as- 
pects could initially be motivated when the project was 
able to capture the imagination. Unfortunately, it is an 
uncontrollable force that cannot be created as an incen- 
tive for performance of a particular task by a contractor. 
However, its existence or nonexistence does provide a 
clue as to whether substitute motivators must be provided. 
Recognition of demotivators is equally as important 
as the recognition of the motivating factors to the mani- 
pulation of a contractor. The following are some of the 
more important demotivators : 
(1) Heavy commitment by the administrator. 
(2) Measure of performance and award fee. 
A. Heavy Commitment by the Administrator 
There are circumstances in which the system adminis- 
trator is forced to acquiesce even though the contractor 
has performed unsatisfactorily. These circumstances exist 
frequently in space exploration programs where timing 
is critical and the available money is usually limited. 
After the selection among competitive contractors is 
finalized, the winning contractor essentially has the 
administrator heavily committed in schedule, money, and 
technique used. With this heavy commitment, the con- 
tractor fully realizes that his services will be accepted 
even though the performance is inadequate. This fact 
seriously undermines any substitute motivators the 
administrator may try to provide. 
B. Measure of Performance and Award Fee 
The use of incentive award approach is an attempt to 
influence contractor behavior by correlating performance 
and the size of the award received. Unfortunately, the 
measure of performance of a contractor is often based 
on factors that are replete with subjective judgments, 
and therefore seriously impedes the effectiveness of this 
approach in accomplishing its intended purpose. Because 
of this imperfection, the incentive award approach can 
serve to motivate, have a deadband of no motivation, or 
demotivate performance on the part of a contractor. As 
mentioned before, since performance cannot be ade- 
quately measured, there is no certainty or assurance in 
the mind of the contractor that tangible effort will 
change the result of the subjective judgment. Superior 
performance ratings do seem to incite continued superior 
performance. Average performance ratings seem to create 
no reaction one way or another, and thus a deadband 
of no motivation appears to develop. Poor reviews do 
not obtain immediate improvement but appear to cause 
resentment and defensiveness that may lead to further 
performance degradation. Such a large schism develops 
that ratings cannot be honestly applied any longer but 
are used as a bribe to bolster egos in hopes of gaining 
improved performance. 
6 
the 
Factors considered in the preceding section dichotomize 
into uncontrollable and controllable motives from the 
point of view of the administrator. From the list of 
considerations, the following are regarded as uncon- 
trollable: 
(1) Interests and personal background of the principals. 
(2) Size of the contractor. 
(3) Size of the contract. 
(4) Relative size of the contract in relation to the 
contractor’s business. 
(5) Age of the contractor. 
(6) Status of the business climate. 
(7) Glamour of the work. 
Since they are uncontrollable, these factors are not 
suitable for the purpose of contractor manipulation. 
Rather, they are used as guides to the selection of con- 
tractor best suited for a given project. For example, for 
a program of modest size with a substantial state-of-the- 
art technical advancement requirement, the ideal con- 
tractor appears to be a relatively small, young, and 
dynamic organization in a related technological expand- 
ing field whose management is highly technically 
oriented. As another example, if it is assumed technical 
competence is equal, the most suitable contractor for a 
development program with large follow-on production 
potential should be a larger size firm with adequate 
production capability whose principals strongly believe 
in long-term sales prospects, provided that the develop- 
ment cost is not a limiting factor. On the other hand, if 
development money is somewhat tight, the program may 
best be conducted by a company emphasizing budget 
and financial control and seeking an immediate account- 
ing profit. 
These factors are influential on the contract results, 
and, although uncontrollable, relate to the controllable 
factors by the amount of effort necessary through the 
controllable factors in making up for their deficiencies. 
The uncontrollable factors are only free parameters up 
to the point of contractor selection. 
The preceding might be summarized as follows: (1) 
know your needs and requirements, (2) know your con- 
tractors and know them well, and (3) select the contractor 
best suited for your needs. 
From the list of considerations, the remaining are 
regarded as controllable: 
(1) Survival of the principals. 
(2) Profit. 
(3) Ancillary profits. 
These may further be bifurcated into areas identified 
in this analysis as surveillance and incentive award 
under the general term “strategies,” and will be con- 
sidered for manipulation of the contractor. 
Because of the consciousness of personal survival in 
the part of the contractor key personnel, surveillance 
appears to play an important role in shaping the course 
of successful contract performance. By surveillance, we 
shall mean the followup done as a consequence of de- 
ficiencies noted in the monitoring and supervision of the 
contractor. Surveillance is the incessant aiding and pres- 
suring exerted on all management levels of the contractor 
to extract the desired performance; it is perhaps one of 
the more uniformly and personally felt incentives (or 
negative incentives) that an administrator can impose 
effectively. 
A carefully planned surveillance procedure is essential 
if it is to successfully complement other tangible in- 
centives or serve as a substitute when incentive alone 
appears to fail. For a system with parameter specifica- 
tions, a proper surveillance function is the amount of 
followup that is accomplished as a function of the ob- 
served values of the hardware parameter detected during 
the execution of the contract. It should be recognized 
that, in actual practice, there are four difFiculties in 
executing the surveillance function: (1) the difficulty in 
making certain that the surveillance function (the amount 
of pressure, etc.) corresponds to the followup actually 
accomplished, (2) the difficulty in recognizing needed 
action and in making the followup timely enough to be 
effectual in corrective action, (3) the difficulty of equat- 
ing a subjective factor into money, and (4) the difficulty 
on the part of the administrator to ask for more than the 
intent of the original contract during the execution of 
the contract. 
The incentive award takes advantage of the desire of 
the contractor to enhance accounting profit, and it is 
adaptable to system development contracts when param- 
eter specifications are used as the yardstick for per- 
formance measurement. Thus, performance can be 
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objectively evaluated and the incentive award can be for- 
mulated in direct relationship with the ultimate achieve- 
ment of the parameter under consideration. In this 
case, the contractor knows where he stands in terms of 
the probable award, the necessary added expenditure, 
and effort needed. The hostility caused by subjective 
measures of performance can be avoided with this 
strategy. 
In much of the previous discussion, the considerations 
have alluded to many of the motivations of the personnel 
in the contractor’s organization. It seems appropriate to 
make one last reference to this before reducing the 
contractor to a “Black Box” to which we uniformly apply 
our strategies for convenience of analysis. Figure 1 de- 
picts what is regarded as relative influences of various 
strategies on a relatively personal basis. 
For a well-planned surveillance activity with appro- 
priate pressure exerted on all levels of the contractor’s 
organization, an ideal effect curve of constant magnitude 
over the entire range of organizational position would 
result. Under this condition, the surveillance strategy 
attains its highest effectiveness. The profit curves reflect 
the general tendency that the relative influence of incen- 
tive award strategy is directly related to ranking in the 
organizational structure. The characteristics of the profit 
curve, however, may take in many forms depending on 
such factors as individual attitude, company structure, 
and the degree of emphasis on profit as a corporate 
policy. It is conceivable that an unhealthy attitude taken 
by a certain key person in the middle management level 
could change the curve abruptly as shown in one of the 
example curves. 
The pride of achievement has much to do with per- 
sonal satisfaction of the working engineers to perfect the 
products they build. Scherer (Ref. 4) makes the following 
remark: “As one reaches further down into a develop- 
ment organization, the preoccupation with quality for its 
own sake appears to increase.” As a probable result, 
unnecessary features may be built into the product at 
the expense of cost. Management is aware of this and 
usually tries to prevent this sort of activity. 
V. Random Influences 
With the current state of knowledge relating to random 
processes, one does not need to argue that all design and 
manufacturing processes have random factors associated 
with them. While at times these random factors appear 
to be uncontrollable, to assume such would be contrary 
to experience. Improvements are made continually and 
appear to be largely limited by the resources available 
to achieve them rather than fundamental limits. 
In some cases, such random influences as variation of 
component parameters, aging, environment, inaccuracy 
in measurement, and human error may be known during 
the design and manufacturing process. 
A parameter of a design is the result of its individual 
attributes. To control a parameter, the design (synthesis) 
process generally attempts to consider as many of these 
factors as possible within some resource frame and to 
eliminate or reduce the effect of each through decisions. 
Those factors that cannot be properly considered in the 
decision process are generally relegated to having their 
effects discovered in the testing of pilot models. These 
may be removed in whole or part by redesign, selection, 
or adjustment; or they may be ignored altogether. The 
manufacturing may only use selection and adjustment in 
altering the parameter. 
Random influences in nature are obviously a part of 
the problem under consideration; to assume otherwise 
would result in a certainty and thus there would be no 
problem to solve. By convention of Decision Theory, the 
random state of nature will be referred to as an un- 
intelligent adversary. By using decision, selection, and 
adjustment, the contractor has control of this unintelli- 
gent adversary and, thus, the probability density func- 
tions of a hardware parameter. Decision, selection, and 
adjustment have a definite cost associated with them, and 
their degree of success will be determined largely by the 
resources available for their removal. 
VI. Formal Statement of the Problem 
The preceding discussion of the factors surrounding 
this problem is a rather formidable and inconcise state- 
ment of the problem, which may be barely visible. Before 
a solution is attempted, it is expedient to extract from 
the above discussion a short, precise, and formal state- 
ment of the problem. 
First of all, a reiteration of the objective should be 
made. The objective is to determine (1) the a priori prob- 
ability density functions of a hardware performance 
parameter delivered by a contractor to specification and 
(2) strategies for manipulation of the contractor to obtain 
satisfactory probability density functions. 
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For the remainder of the formal statement of the 
problem it is convenient to think of the administrator 
and contractor roles as that of two players in a game 
with an unintelligent adversary included. The above 
discussion has served more or less as a description of the 
play; it is now necessary to determine from the play, 
the rules under which they were playing. This will be 
difEcult since there never is a full meeting of the minds 
or formal statement of all the rules between the admin- 
istrator and the contractor in an actual situation. Never- 
theless, it is necessary to state these rules, no matter how 
weak the inference, that apparently control the parts of 
the game in which there is an interest. 
efinitisn of Basis 
The previous section provided a formulation of the 
problem as a set of axioms to either accept or reject. 
Once these axioms are accepted, and it appears reason- 
able that they be accepted, they must be converted into 
mathematical terms, and appropriate solutions then can 
be sought for quantitative results, which is the object of 
this section. This section also discusses some fundamental 
concepts on which the derivation of the sought-after 
probability density function is based. 
A. Expected Payoff 
The contractor’s self-interests will be measured in 
monetary terms; although, they may in fact be quite 
subjective in nature. Subjective factors will essentially 
be converted to money with appropriate value constants. 
With this measure, the following accepted and practiced 
From the previous sections, the following rules or 
axioms are hypothesized to suffice in describing the 
base from which the administrator/contractor relation 
proceeds : 
concept of net profit or payoff will be used: net profit (1) The administrator has the choice of strategies that = - or symbolically, 
are to be applied to the contractor. 
(2) The contractor has knowledge of the strategies. N ( x )  = R(x) - C(x)  (1) 
(3) The contractor is going to act in some rational 
fashion according to the strategies to enhance his 
own self-interests. 
(4) The contractor has some unintelligent adversaries. 
(5) The contractor has some choice in the control over 
the unintelligent adversaries. 
By (l), is meant that options such as more money, incen- 
tives, surveillance, etc. may be applied as a choice by the 
administrator. This does not mean that these are applied 
without mutual consent. By (2), is meant that no strategy 
is to be applied in any clandestine manner. Any strat- 
egy is to be applied in full view of the contractor. It is 
assumed that it provides nothing to the performance of 
the contract if the contractor has to guess the rules under 
which he is to play. This factor carries over into (3) with 
the assumption that the contractor can only act rationally 
if he knows the rules under which he plays. In (3) it is 
also implied that irrational behavior is beyond the scope 
of this analysis. Axioms (4) and (5) have previously been 
discussed adequately. 
where 
x = value of a hardware parameter delivered by a 
N ( x )  = net profit or payoff for delivering a hardware 
R(x) = reward for delivering a hardware parameter 
C(x)  = cost to the contractor to deliver a hardware 
contractor 
parameter of x 
of x 
parameter of x 
If the value x were purely deterministic, the maximiza- 
tion procedure would be simply to seek the value xo that 
maximized N ( x ) ;  and there would be no further problem. 
Having accepted the axiom that the contractor has 
unintelligent adversaries (nature), we have accepted the 
fact that the outcome is not altogether deterministic. 
In the face of this adversity, instead of net profit, we 
can only measure the expected net profit. 
Em641 = E [ W I  - E[C(x)l (2) It is believed that these axioms describe the game 
adequately; however, if one does not accept them, it is 
believed that the method of the solution to follow does 
analysis now proceeds to results not found in the pre- 
vious discussion of the play. 
where 
not materially change with other formulations. The EM41 = J f ( M x ) d x  
which is the expected value of f(x). 
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Here, f ( x )  is a dummy weighting function and p ( x )  is 
the probability density function of delivering the value x. 
The factor that the contractor attempts to maximize in 
his own self-interests then is the expected payoff, rather 
than the payoff function itself. Now 
where A and B are, respectively, the lower and the upper 
allowable limits of x. They may represent an unbounded 
or infinite range. The only term not specified in Eq. (3) is 
the functional p(x) ,  the sought-after probability density 
function. 
It is assumed that the functional p ( x )  is selectable or 
controllable. Of course, if there is no control to be exer- 
cised by the contractor on the outcome of the parameter 
x, then the expected payoff is uncontrollable. The fact 
that the contractor has choice in the design, selection, 
and adjustment allows him to control p ( x )  in exchange 
for cost. Consciously or unconsciously, the contractor will 
attempt to coordinate his efforts so that the resultant 
p ( x )  maximizes his expected payoff. 
B. Expected Reward 
The reward function is straightforward and warrants 
only brief comment. This function will vary from situa- 
tion to situation and is specified by the contract admin- 
istrator. One of the primary reward functions that will 
be used in this analysis is a triangular reward function 
(Fig. 2). In this case R(x) = K,T(x )  where T(X) is a nor- 
malized function such that 
and k, is a constant for adjusting the appropriate unit of 
measure and magnitude. 
This function was motivated by a situation where there 
was a technical conflict of interest. Specifically, a space- 
craft transmitter design incentive was considered to 
increase the reward linearly beyond some wanted value 
of transmitter output power, and then to decrease beyond 
some higher value so as to discourage the unrestricted 
use of raw power for the transmitter. 
C. Expected Costs 
The cost function for the contractor is rather compli- 
cated, yet important to the analysis, and will require 
considerable discussion. This discussion will be broken 
into two aspects: (1) subjective costs as a result of 
surveillance, which will be equated in monetary terms, 
and (2) real costs. 
Subjective costs will be lumped together into what will 
be called the surveillance function. (The term surveil- 
lance is discussed in Section IV.) As mentioned before, 
there are several difficulties in actual practice in formu- 
lating and executing a surveillance function realistically. 
It is also difEcult to equate the subjective factors with a 
measurable quantity such as money. 
In practice, management attention appears to increase 
rather rapidly as the hardware parameter deviates from 
the desired nominal value. This would indicate that the 
surveillance function selected should be such that it is 
zero at the nominal value and monotonically increasing 
as the value deviates away from the nominal value. The 
one selected for use here is S(x) = k,(x - xo)2 where S(x) 
is the surveillance function, k, is a constant for adjusting 
the appropriate unit of measure and magnitude, and 
xo is the nominal value. 
(BT(x)dx  = 1 
J-B 
This function appears to adequately describe the 
observed attention management gives for values of the 
parameter other than nominal and will be the surveil- 
lance function used throughout this analysis. It should 
be noted that this is a cost to the contractor that is not 
reimbursable and that he would like to avoid or minimize. 
& A 
specification. Here again we will be talking about non- 
reimbursable costs to the contractor. The cost function 
Fig. 2. Triangular reward function reflects the relationship between the improvement in the 
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probability density function p ( x )  and the indirect eco- 
nomic burden imposed on the contractor for such an 
improvement. 
A contractor has considerable choice during his design 
process. As each choice is pursued in an effort to improve 
the probability density function p ( x ) ,  facilities and per- 
sonnel are involved in pursuing each of the various 
choices and delays are caused beyond that estimated. 
Each of these factors can dilute the contractor’s profit on 
investment that he will try to avoid unless there is some 
other profit to be gained. How this cost is related to p ( x )  
is the subject of the remainder of this section. 
Several methods were investigated for the purpose of 
establishing the real cost function; however, only one of 
these methods proved to be useful. The various un- 
successful methods used and the reasons for their rejec- 
tion are presented in the following paragraphs. 
An attempt at a microscopic point of view led to the 
consideration that the unperturbed, natural, or no-eff ort 
result is caused by many identifiable random factors. 
The contractor tries to modify parameters of the proba- 
bility density function of each factor to obtain improve- 
ment of his product. When these factors are combined in 
a linear fashion, the natural probability density function 
po(x) will have the form 
where pi(x) is the probability density function of the ith 
contributor and * indicates convolution. When the first i 
contributors are removed by design, modification, and 
adjustment, the modified probability density function 
would then be 
where F[pi(x)] is the Fourier Transform of pi (x). 
A cost function that might be envisioned would be a 
function of j such that cost = f ( j ) .  Much further consid- 
eration was deemed fruitless because (1) the factors are 
not believed to be even vaguely linear, (2) mathematics 
other than for linear relations would be too cumbersome, 
and (3) the results would be too particular and difficult 
to obtain. 
Another method was to consider the improvement of 
the parameter probability density function through design, 
selection, and adjustment as a Markov process. Then, 
where po(x)  is again the natural probability density func- 
tion and P is the Markov transition matrix. Again, a cost 
function that might be envisioned would be a function 
of i, the number of steps in the Markov process, and 
cost = f ( j ) .  This process has the advantage of making it 
clear that each design, selection, and adjustment step, 
although it contributes to the improvement, does not 
yield a certainty in the result and, if j is large enough, 
p(x)  is not too sensitive to the assumed form of p o ( x ) .  
However, it is difEcult to specify a meaningful transition 
matrix P. (This method was not considered seriously 
enough to argue the continuous case for x.) 
The microscopic point of view was generally aban- 
doned in favor of a more gross or macroscopic point of 
view. The next method involved the use of a statistical 
average as was used for the reward and surveillance func- 
tions. Assume that expected cost is equal to f{E[g(x)]}, 
where g(x) is some function relating to cost. 
One of the first forms of this type that was investigated 
assumed that the cost would be a function of the standard 
deviation u of the mobability density function such as, 
expectedcost oc l/u. 
It appeared reasonable that the narrower, or the more 
peaked, the probability density function, or the smaller 
the standard deviation of the probability density function, 
the more the cost should be. These conditions are 
generally correlated. Although this reasoning is tenable, 
“pathological” examples can be illustrated to show that a 
function of the standard deviation u is not a proper 
measure of cost for this analysis and it also appears 
untractable. 
One would expect the probability density function 
shown in Fig. 3a to have a finite cost and that shown in 
Fig. 3b to have an infinite cost. These costs would appear 
to be consistent with the three factors listed above. If one 
were to decompose these probability density functions 
into those depicted in Fig. 4, one would again expect 
the probability density function shown in Fig. 4a to 
have a finite cost (equal to that of the previous example) 
and that shown in Fig. 4b to have an infinite cost. The 
fact that both have finite standard deviations in contrast 
to the previous examples would indicate that the standard 
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deviation should not be used as a measure of the cost. 
It does, however, still appear to be related to the proba- 
bility density function in its value and degree of spread- 
ing. Whether or not the values are clustered, or whether 
or not the probability density function is decomposed 
with translations, seems to be irrelevant to the cost. This 
leads to the belief that the cost function is a function of 
the probability density function itself and not the param- 
eter x explicitly. The value of x has no bearing on the 
cost. Only the relative number that occurs at that value 
determines the cost. This same type of explanation was 
used for justihation of the weighting function for infor- 
mation theory (Ref. 5). In measuring the information 
content, one can interpret the function - ln[p(x)] as being 
another measure of spread other than standard deviation. 
Woodward (Ref. 5 )  explains the use of -ln[p(x)] as a 
measure of spread for attributes that are merely qualita- 
tive; unfortunately, it cannot be used as the cost function, 
since it yields results opposite to those outlined above. 
To obtain an alternate cost function, consider that the 
expected cost 
contains a satisfactory function g[p(x)] that is to be de- 
termined. The four characteristics or axioms that g[p(x)] 
should satisfy are as follows: 
(1) Continuity: The functional C, as defined in the 
above integral is continuous in p ( x ) .  
(2) Positive Bound: For any nonrestricted family of 
p(x)  (nonrestricted in the sense that the variable x 
is not bounded), C, = 0 when 
- R < x < R  1 p(x) = lim - 
R + m  2R ' 
For any restricted family of p(x) ,  C ,  is a minimum 
when 
In both cases, C,  + 00 when p ( x )  = 6(x). 
(3) Monotonicity: The function g[p(x)] is a monotonic 
increasing function of p(x) ;  therefore, g[p(x)] = 0 
when p ( x )  = 0, and g[p(x)]+ co when p(x)+ co. 
(4) Uniqueness: The functional C,  is unique with 
respect to p(x) .  
There is an unlimited class of functions that satisfies 
these axioms, such as: g[p(x)] = p"(x), where N is a posi- 
tive integer and g[p(x)] = -;l. To be more defini- 
tive in specifying a satisfactory function, define a dif- 
ferential cost in the neighborhood of x,  as follows: 
12 JPL TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 33-439 
and further specify that the rate of change of AC, with 
respect to p(x)  be proportional to p(xo) or 
With the relationship (Ref. 6) 
aa ab 
dY aY a Y  
df = lb v d x  - F(a,y,)- + F(b,y) - 
then 
Now if 
then 
JX~-AX 
2dx = p(xo) 4Ax 
Therefore, g [ p ( x ) ]  = p ( x )  satisfies the above statement. 
On this basis, the required expected cost is 
c, = J kcp2 (x)dx 
In later sections of the report, this function will be shown 
to be tractable. 
The above function can be interpreted as the average 
of the probability density function (first moment about 
the x axis) or clustering of the random variable x. 
The arguments previously used are perfectly valid; 
however, they do not fully eliminate the strong intuitive 
feeling one has about the usefulness of the k c / g  cost 
function. In reconsideration of this intuitive feeling, a 
study was made of a report by R. M. Stewart." The cost 
function used in that report is of the form 
*"Component Cost and Accuracy Allocations in Guidance System 
Design," JPL Section Report 12-129, Nov. 16, 1953. 
where k and a are positive constants. This function was 
found to be quite useful in Stewart's report and can be 
interpreted very simply in that analysis. 
The function l/a is very strongly entrenched as a 
measure of cost, yet E(cost) was the only form found 
tractable €or the purpose of this analysis. Both functions 
have been said to be measures of spread of the proba- 
bility density function and both have been shown to be 
useful for different purposes. This fact leads to the ques- 
tions: (1) Are the two functions measures of spread? 
(2) Are they always or sometimes equivalent? (3) Is one 
more general than the other? (4) Is it possible that these 
two functions are not equivalent, yet are used to measure 
the same term for different purposes? To answer these 
questions, five specific examples of rather elementary 
probability density functions were examined. This exam- 
ination expresses E(cost) in terms of l/a. 
As the first example, consider the Gaussian probability 
density function of 
Evaluate then, 
with the Gaussian probability density function. 
Now 
But 
If 
r = - ( T )  1 N + 1  Y2 
IS 
13 
then p ( x )  = he-Ax, o < x <  co 
= 0, elsewhere 
which is the same form as used by Stewart. 
m 
= k, h N + 1  [ e - ( N + l ) A X  For the special case of N = 1, then 
E,(cost) = - 2& (+) J o  
which (for this particular example) is equivalent to that 
used previously but found to be untractable in general. But 
u2 = E(x’) - E’(x) As a second example, consider the rectangular proba- 
bility density function of 
x 2 x e - A x  - ( lm xhe-Ax 
- A < x < A  
1 P ( 4  = -g-’ 
Now 
But 
or 
N 
= k, (&) 
or 
N+1 
E,(cost) = k, 1; (-&) dx 1 
h 
v = -  
Then 
(11) 
1 
kc (A) = &(N)--p 
( N  + 1) U N  E,(cost) = 
As a fourth example, consider the triangular proba- 
bility density function of 
A = (Q)*‘a 
= 0, elsewhere 
Then 
Evaluate then 
As a third example, consider the exponential proba- 
bility density function of 
E,(cost) = k, 1.” (G) N+l ax 
E,(cost) = k, 
N + l  B N + 2  
(;) Nf2 
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and when 
&(cost) = k,  - 
x = 0, y = c  
x = - c ,  y = o  
But 
u2 = E(X2) - E2(X) Let 
Then 
z = (x - c )  
dz = dx 
and when 
x = 0, z =  -c 
x = c, z = O  
or 
B = 3(2)y'u 
Now 
Then 
1 
E4(cost) = k, 
As a fifth and final example, consider the triangular 
probability density function of ( - 1)N+1( - C ) N + 2 ]  [#+2 - 
kc - 
( N  + 2)C2N+2 
- 2kC - 2k, c ~ + ~  - 
( N  + 2)  c2"2 ( N  + 2)CN 
-1 
C2 
= -(x - c),  o < x < c  and u2 can be readily obtained by noting that the triangu- 
lar probability density function of this example is the con- 
volution of the probability density function of the second 
example with itself when 2A = C. Since u,2 was A2/3  for 
the second example, then 
= 0, elsewhere 
Now 
&(cost) = 
2A = C Let 
y = ( x  + c)  
Then 
or 
c = u(2 x 3 y 2  
5 
Then 
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained with the five 
types of probability density functions. It is obvious that 
all the results are equal within a multiplicative constant 
and that they are of the form intuitively thought to be 
reasonable. In the general form, the results are identical 
to those proposed by Stewart and, in the restricted case 
of N = 1, they are identical to those discussed previously 
but found to be untractable in general. This demonstra- 
tion of equivalence for these five samples shows a com- 
patibility between the two concepts that suppresses 
most of the criticism of the E(cost) function. 
In retrospect, it seems that the equivalence in the above 
examples could have been predicted, because the proba- 
bility density functions that were used as examples can all 
be expressed uniquely in terms of p and u as parameters. 
It is believed that any probability density function that 
does not change its form with U, such as the examples 
above, will have an equivalence to E(cost). However, 
E(cost) is believed to have a broader meaning since it 
encompasses, as tractable, pathological cases not covered 
by l / ~ .  With these pathological cases, it has been shown 
that the cost functions are not always equivalent. With 
this fact in mind, there should be no difficulty in accept- 
ing E(cost) in the analysis by Stewart. 
Table 1 .  Summary of results 
Type of probability 
density function 
E i  (cost, N)  
I Gaussian 
I Rectangular 
I Exponential 
seen, N = 1 is the best power for this purpose since the 
normalized E(cost) factors are within a factor of 2 for 
the cases analyzed. 
i l i  
A. Calculus of Variations Technique 
To obtain the maximizing probability density function 
p(x )  of Eq. (3), techniques of the calculus of variations 
may be applied. The calculus of variations is a mathe- 
matical method by which unknown functions that maxi- 
mize or minimize certain integral expressions can be 
determined. 
The manipulation of the calculus of variations is rela- 
tively simple. For a specific integral of the form 
where the integrand is twice-differentiable, a necessary 
condition for y(x) to maximize (or minimize) the integral, 
if such a function exists, is that it satisfy Euler’s equation 
(Ref. 7) 
In the special case when the integrand is independent 
of y’, the conditions 
generally hold for maximizing (minimizing) the integral 
(Ref. 8). 
When additional constraints such as 
( N k )  (3 I 
I Right triangle (17) 
Symmetric triangle are imposed, a modified integral may be formed such that 
Figure 5 shows E(cost) normalized by k, /g  with N 
as a variable; the purpose of this is to determine the 
power N that makes all the cost factors the most uniform 
I* = lr F*(x,y,y’)dx 
for all probability density functions. As can easily be = 1” Xl (I? + i=1 5&Gi) dx (18) 
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Fig. 5. Normalized cost coefficients vs  positive integers 
and this integral may be maximized with the prescribed 
method as though there were no constraints (Ref. 9). In 
Eq. (18), Ai are constants known as Lagrange multipliers. 
These constants can be evaluated in such a way that the 
maximizing function satisfies all of the constraints as 
indicated by Eq. (17). 
It should be mentioned that in the calculus of varia- 
tions, the sufficient conditions for maxima (or minima) 
are difficult to derive. For many instances, however, 
numerical checks can be performed to show that the indi- 
cated results are indeed the desired optimizing function. 
The integral equation in its general form, from which 
the maximizing probability density function is derived, 
can now be formulated. Thus, 
I* = [k,r(x) - k,s(x) - k,p(x) + A]p(x)dx (19) 
subject to the conditions 
This integral can be used to determine the Lagrange 
multiplier A. These constraints are necessary to make the 
resultant p ( x )  a proper probability density function. 
The conventional techniques of the calculus of varia- 
tions create a special problem when they are applied 
to probability problems because the derivation for the 
special problem does not include consideration of the in- 
equality constraint. As a consequence, the resultant func- 
tional p ( x )  comes from a class of both positive and 
negative functions and, therefore, may violate the ine- 
quality constraint p ( x )  2 0. To eliminate this difficulty, an 
operator U ( p )  is introduced that has the following 
properties : 
Hence, the desired probability density function is repre- 
sented as the non-negative function U(p)p (x )  that satisfies 
the inequality constraint, rather than p ( x ) ,  which does not. 
The use of U ( p )  does not violate the basic considera- 
tions of the calculus of variations. It merely serves to sift 
out the positive functional from all functionah that satisfy 
the basic integral constraint. In the examples that follow, 
it will be demonstrated that U ( p )  modifies the valid 
range or ranges of definition of the integrals in which 
the resultant p ( x )  satisfies both constraints. In these 
ranges, techniques in elementary calculus of variations 
are applicable, as if U ( p )  were not included; with this 
treatment, Eq. (19) becomes 
subject to the single constraint 
The associated Euler equation then becomes 
which, for the case of concern to this problem, is 
The treatment of the inequality constraint used herein 
is believed to be unique. It was developed because the 
only other technique known was the intuitive technique 
discussed in the following section. The intuitive tech- 
nique shall be referred to as the area subtraction method. 
Another technique, developed by B. 0. Koopman, was 
discovered later (Ref. 2). The equivalence of these three 
methods wiU be discussed in detail. 
B. Area Subtraction Method (Graphical Solution) 
U ( - p )  = 0, if p ( x )  2 0 Although the desired probability density function for 
any given strategy is readily obtainable by the prescribed 
analytical methods, the established procedures are not 
best suited for the generation of a computer program 
fitting all conceivable strategies. The difficulty is in the 
The functional p ( x )  is then written as the sum of a posi- 
tive functional U(p)p (x )  and a negative functional 
U ( - P ) p ( x )  or 
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determination of the region in which the probability 
density function is valid (i.e., range for U ( p )  = 1). The 
ease of such determination varies depending upon the 
strategic function. The area subtraction method can 
overcome this difficulty and the step-by-step procedure 
for this method is as follows: 
(a) 
An unrestricted probability density function p ( x )  
(unrestricted in the sense that p ( x )  can assume 
negative values) is obtained by the conventional 
calculus of variations methods. 
This probability density function is checked over 
the entire permissible range R for negative p(x ) .  
If p ( x )  is non-negative in R, it becomes the desired 
probability density function. 
If p ( x )  is negative in some region in R, the prob- 
ability density function is to be modified by seek- 
ing a baseline P b  in such a manner that the total 
area in R bounded by p ( x )  (upper bound) and Pb 
(lower bound) is equal to unity. This can be done 
by way of successive approximation. 
The desired probability density function in this 
case becomes 
= 0, otherwise (21) 
for all values of x in R. 
This method was first conceived intuitively without 
rigorous mathematical proof. It is argued that the prob- 
ability density function obtained directly from the con- 
ventional calculus of variations techniques has the form 
in which the Langrange multiplier A is a function of 
J,r(x)dx, where T ( X )  is the general strategic or reward 
function. The constraint p(x )  2 0 is violated when the 
minimum value of T ( X )  is less than (-A). With the tri- 
angular incentive award case as an example, this situation 
is presented in Fig. 6. 
Both Fig. 6 and Eq. (22) suggest that the modified 
probability density function p*(x)  must assume the same 
form of T(X) (Fig. 7) although the characteristic constants 
of the probability density function (in this particular 
example the limit value X) cannot be readily determined. 
 -0 0 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x- 
Fig. 6. Demonstrated example for violation of p(x) 2 0: 
(a) strategic function; (b) p(x) obtained through calculus 
of variations method 
However, it can be realized that the slopes of the curve 
p*(x) must be the same as those of p(x) ,  and that the area 
under p*(x)  must be equal to unity. The algorithm that 
satisfies both of these requirements is to subtract the area 
below the value p ( x )  = 0 from the area above p ( x )  = 0 
by establishing the baseline P b  in the manner previously 
discussed. This method is graphically presented in Fig. 8. 
From the geometry of the curve given in Fig. 8, the 
following relationship can be established. 
and the value X can be evaluated from this equation. 
This same approach is also applicable to other forms of 
~ ( x )  and is not restricted to linear symmetrical functions. 
The remaining question is whether the value of X so 
computed is indeed the desired characteristic constant 
that maximizes the expected payoff. The answer can 
be determined if the results of this method are compared 
to the analytical method described in the preceding 
0 +B I + " \e - - -  -B --- 
-a 0 U 
Fig. 7. Relationship between p* (x )  and r ( x ) :  (a) obtained 
and modified distributions; (b) strategic function 
section, or if the integration of the expected payoff 
utilizing p * ( x )  is carried out and if the maximizing value 
of X is determined through the conventional calculus 
methods. Results of several example problems confirm 
the validity of the area subtraction method at least for 
those strategic functions considered. 
C. Analogous Methods in the Search Problem 
An article by B. 0. Koopman (Ref. 2) discusses a prob- 
lem in which an optimum distribution of search effort is 
sought. This problem is very similar to the one presented 
here, as far as mathematical application is concerned. 
In Ref. 2, a distribution of search effort q ( x )  that maxi- 
mizes the overall probability of detecting a target is 
sought, given the probability density function of the 
location of the target. Since effort cannot be meaningfully 
measured in negative terms, a constraint of the problem 
is that 
Fig. 8. Graphical presentation of area 
subtraction method 
This constraint is comparable to the condition of the 
current problem (Eq. 19). 
To solve this problem, Koopman devised a graphical 
method that is in essence the same as the area subtraction 
method. Mathematical treatment is also given in Ref. 2 
to prove the validity of the graphical solution and to 
show the general solution of that problem. 
It is encouraging to note that by applying the analytical 
method utilizing the operator U ( q )  to the search problem, 
the same resultant probability density function as real- 
ized by Koopman is obtained. 
In  the following, the analogy between the three 
methods is shown utilizing a general form of expected 
payoff function E [ N ( x ) ] .  
1. Solution by the operator U(p) method. In the oper- 
ator method, an operator U ( p )  is used with the probabil- 
ity density function p ( x )  to form a restricted distribution. 
The operator has the following properties: 
Therefore, the followihg equations may be written 
20 
With this modification, the condition p ( x )  2 0 becomes 
an intrinsic part of the probability density function and 
the maximizing probability density function is limited 
to this class of functions. 
Without loss of generality, the incentive award payoff 
function is used as an example to obtain a specific 
probability density function for comparison purposes. 
Thus, 
With the previously prescribed techniques, the following 
can be written: 
The remaining problem is to determine the zero cross- 
ings of ~ ( x ) ,  if they exist, and to establish the valid region 
of R. This can be readily performed, given r(x) and the 
relative magnitude of the associated constants. The com- 
plete solution and derivation of this probability density 
function are given in Section IX. 
2. Solution by  the area subtraction method. The area 
subtraction method is a numerical process for the solution 
of the desired probability density function. Concisely, the 
desired probability density function is a modified version 
of the probability density function directly obtained by 
the conventional calculus of variations techniques through 
the following relationship: 
= 0, otherwise (27) 
for all values of x within the permissible range. Here, 
p * ( x )  is the desired probability density function, and 
P b  is a constant. Notice that the following: conditions 
F* = k ~ ( x ) p ( x ) U ( P )  - k[P(x)u(P)12+ hP(x)U(P) 
and 
Rearranged, 
Y 
are true: 
J P ( 4 h  = 1 
The relationship among the three terms in Eq. (27) is 
shown pictorially in Fig. 8. 
The term x/2kC may be evaluated according to the With the same incentive award function, the following 
condition given in Eq. (25). Hence, can be written 
Let us designate R as the area where U ( p )  = 1 within 
the permissible range - B  5 x 2 B, then 
x 
2k, R 
where Q is a constant. 
Since, within the region R, 
Consequently, pa = P ( 4  - P * ( 4  
which is the desired probability density function. 
or If (1) is applied to the spec& problem of Koopman, 
and if, as before, R is designated as the area where 
cp(x) > 0, then the function to be considered in the 1 
T(x)& + Q - R ("1 maximization is 
Now, when Eqs. (28) and (29) are substituted into Eq. (27), 
the result is 
fl(x)[l - e - ~ ( ~ ) ]  - xcp(x) 
which results in 
which is identical to Eq. (26). Therefore, the proof of 
equivalence between the operator U ( p )  method and the 
area subtraction method is complete. 
Accordingly, 
fl(x) e-v@) = A (31) 
3. Solution b y  the Koopman method. Koopman sought 
a distribution of search effort ~ ( x )  that maximized the 
probability of P ,  of detecting a target that is given by 
Taking the logarithm of Eq. (31) gives 
v(x) = log fl(X) - logx (32) 
P ,  = Jfl(.)[l - cP(*)]d3c 
in which log A can be determined by 
subject to 
Jcp(x)dx = Q, cpw 2 0 b c p ( x ) h  = b [log f1(x) - log xldx = Q 
log x = - R [ 1 logfl(x)h - @I 
In this problem, fl(x) is the probability density function 
of the target location that is assumed to be known; and @ 
is a constant representing the total allotted search effort. 
so that 
1 
In solving this problem, Koopman has formally intro- 
duced a mathematical treatment utilizing a "special vari- 
ation" from which a condition analogous to the classical 
Euler equation can be derived. This treatment was later 
generalized by S.Zahl (Ref. 10) who reformulated the 
problem in the form: 
By substitution, then 
V(X) = logf,(x) + 
Maximize 
subject to 
Jg[x,cp(x)Ih = @> d x )  2 0 
The results are presented in the following theorems: 
(1) A necessary and sufficient condition that a function 
cp*(x) maximizes P ,  is that there exist a constant 
such that for almost everywhere, q * ( x )  maximizes 
f[x,cp(x)I - xg[x,cp(x)l, (P(4 > 0 
(2) Subject to certain conditions, there exists an 
element satisfying the condition in (1) (existence 
of a solution). 
Equation (32) clearly indicates that cp(x) can be obtained 
graphically in a manner similar to the area subtraction 
method. A comparison of Eq. (33) with Eq. (26) clearly 
indicates the analogy between the operator U ( p )  method 
and the Koopman method. It should be noted that the 
logarithmic terms in Eq. (33) are the result of the form 
f[x,cp(x)] chosen in the problem. If the latter method 
were applied to the problem presented here, an identical 
solution would have been obtained. 
It is obvious that the three methods for the solution of 
the desired probability density function produce equiv- 
alent results. Although the Koopman method is the most 
elegant, the operator U ( p )  method is the easiest to 
explain because it clearly defines the problem in a simple, 
direct way. For computational simplicity, however, the 
22 EM DUM 33-439 
area subtraction method appears to be the most logical 
choice because it can be readily adapted to a computer 
for solution and presentation. 
Now that the problem has been formulated and the 
method for solution has been developed, example prob- 
lems should be contrived and solved. The theme of the 
examples will be: first, to devise isolated strategies so 
the sensitivity of these strategies may be understood; 
and second, to devise the more difficult mixed strategies 
that more closely resemble a true situation so that the 
sensitivity of these mixed strategies may be understood. 
These examples will be the basis for conclusions dis- 
cussed in the succeeding section. 
A. Isolated Strategies 
1. Incentive award only. The first example to be de- 
scribed is the isolated strategy of offering an incentive 
award based on delivery of a measured hardware param- 
eter. Here, as in all of the examples to follow, all direct 
costs are considered reimbursable; they do not enter 
into the analysis. 
Consider that the incentive award formula is 
1 
r (x)  = - a (1 - +) , os 1x1 sa 
that the triangular function is motivated as explained 
previously, and that the parameter x must be within the 
imposed specification limits B where B is greater than 
a. The coefficient l/a in r (x )  adjusts the area under r (x)  
equal to unity for convenience. With these conditions, 
the expected payoff is 
This formula includes the cost k,p(x)  that is considered 
to be always with the contractor. 
According to the prescribed techniques described in 
Section VIII, 
and 
The probability density function 
results from Eq. (36). 
Because 
it follows that 
and 
By substitution 
If p ( x )  is greater than or equal to zero over the entire 
range I x I 2 B, which is possible under certain condi- 
tions, then 
r (x)dx = dx = 2B s U(P) =1 c 
and 
r(x)dx =/--r(x)dx s U(P) =1 
The resultant probability density function for this case 
is given by 
23 
Substitution of the appropriate r (x)  yields 
=-(l--&-), 1 a < ] x J < B  
2B 
By substitution and mathematical manipulation, it can 
be shown that 
( k, )” ; [ ( k, )” I ;I] p ( x ) =  2k, - 1- - - 2kc 
= 0, elsewhere 
(42) With conventional calculus methods, it can be veri- 
fied that the above value of X indeed maximizes the 
The above probability density function holds only expected payoff of Eq. (34). Verification is accom- 
plished by substitution of the resultant p(x )U(p)  into 
Eq. (34), by the assumption that 
= 0, elsewhere 
when the right-hand member of Eq. (41) is positive. The 
criterion is 
or, in this particular example, 
k,  
k, - 2 0.5 
Otherwise, the range in which U ( p )  = 1 must be estab- 
lished. In this example, when r (x )  is symmetrical about 0, 
let * X  be the boundaries of the range U ( p )  = 1 so that 
the resultant probability density function can be ex- 
pressed as 
Since X is the zero crossing of the probability density 
function, its actual value can be obtained by setting 
p ( x ) U ( p )  = 0 with x = X. Thus, 
k,r(X) + - 1 [ 1 - &( x - &)I = 0 
2kc 2 x  
which yields 
and solving for X. 
The above analytical procedures are equally applicable 
to the cases in which the incentive award formula is not 
symmetrical. 
The result of this analysis indicates that if k,/k,  = 0, 
the probability density function approaches a delta func- 
tion. This condition essentially means that the contractor 
is able to obtain, without cost, any particular parameter 
value he wishes. It is expected that the contractor could 
deliver exactly the same parameter value for all units at 
a value that yields the highest net profit, if he indeed acts 
in a rational manner. Because k ,  = 0 in this case, the 
cost function has served as a “kernel” for the solution 
regardless of its form but does not enter into the result 
itself. From the other extreme, if k,/k,+ co, the proba- 
bility density function reduces to a rectangular form that 
is the most random of all distributions under a peak value 
constraint (Ref. 11). For this value of k , /k ,  condition, 
the contractor can no longer afford to pursue any par- 
ticular parameter value but must settle for whatever 
value he may achieve with minimum effort, provided 
that this value is within the permissible range. In this 
case, one can reasonably expect that the parameter value 
of the units delivered would be uniformly distributed. 
A family of curves is given in Fig. 9 to show the proba- 
bility density function of this strategy for various k,  to 
k, ratios. From these curves, it appears that unless k,  
is relatively large compared to k,, the contractor will not 
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Fig. 9. Probability density function curves for various 
k,/k,  ratios; incentive award strategy 
make much effort to pursue the established incentive 
award. Furthermore, it takes a substantial increase in k, 
to significantly improve the resultant probability density 
function. In other words, the resulting probability density 
function for this strategy is not very sensitive to the in- 
centive award. 
The word “sensitive” in this case is a relative term. 
When incentive contracts are structured, the payoffs 
offered are usually in the low percentages of the direct 
costs. A change of this payoff of say from 3% to 4% 
represents a substantial change in the opinions of the 
administrators. This, however, represents a change in 
the k,/k,  ratios of 1/3, which can be seen in Fig. 9 not 
to change the shape of the resultant probability density 
function substantially. This is particularly true when 
k,/k,  is already large. 
Contract administrators seem to specify the incentive 
award for the purpose of moddymg the probability 
density function without knowledge of its lack of sensi- 
tivity; yet, they have high hopes of good results. When 
the contractor cannot respond with performance match- 
ing those high hopes for reasons shown by the analysis, 
the administrator becomes unhappy with the contractor. 
With this result, the contractor would appear foolish to 
accept an incentive contract for the results specified in 
this problem. Many contractors do in fact refuse to accept 
incentive award contracts. In the face of this analysis, 
this appears to be rational behavior on the part of the 
contractor. 
The reader should be cautioned in interpreting the re- 
sults of this example as well as the following examples 
to note that they represent isolated strategies in most 
cases. This means that there are no external influences 
other than those specified in the example. In a real situ- 
ation, this isolation would be difficult to approach. 
2. More money. Another of the possible isolated 
strategies is to offer the contractor more money prior to 
contract commencement as long as he delivers within 
specification in the hope of obtaining higher quality of 
delivered products in return. In this case, 
where 
Q = fixed amount of money offered 
Then, by the use of Eq. (40), 
1 
2B ’ 0 5  
- - 
- &lBBQdX) 
= 0, elsewhe e (43) 
which is independent of Q. This analysis indicates that, 
regardless of Q, the expected probability density function 
will remain rectangular, because the only concern of the 
contractor, under this strategy, is to keep his internal 
hidden cost down. This result is consistent with the intu- 
itive reasoning that arbitrary offering of additional profit 
is an inferior strategy. 
3. Surueillance. Surveillance, as defined in Section IV, 
is almost universally used and is perhaps the most iso- 
latable of the isolated strategies. 
The surveillance function s(x) is assumed to be 
s(x) = 9, 0 5 I x [ 5 B 
25 
and the expected payoff for this example is 
With this strategy, as with the incentive award strategy, 
the assumptions are: a specification limit of r+B, and the 
contractor’s cost of k,p(x). 
Following the same procedures indicated for the case 
of incentive award strategy, it can be shown that 
k,x2 +-(l+g), 1 O j l x ] < B  
p(.) = - - 2k, 2B 
= 0, elsewhere (45) 
provided that the inequality 
k, 2. 
k ,  - 3 - > - B 3  
1.25 
B 
can be assumed. When the two members of the above 
expression are equal, the distribution reduces to 
-B 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x ---c 
3 
4B p ( ~ )  = 7 (B2  - x’), oi 1x1 I B  
= 0, elsewhere (46) 
It can also be shown that when the k,  to k, ratio is less 
than the critical value, the distribution will be of the 
same form as given in Eq. (46). Thus, 
in which 
This criterion can be verified by maximizing the expected 
payoff (Eq. 44) through the conventional calculus 
methods. 
Figure 10 shows the probability density functions for 
various values of the ratio k,/k, .  As anticipated, the prob- 
B 
Fig. 10. Probability density function curves for 
various k,/k, ratios; surveillance strategy 
ability density function approximates the delta function 
as the said ratio becomes zero. Again, there is a general 
lack of sensitivity of the resulting probability density 
function. This lack of sensitivity is not, however, as re- 
strictive as in the example with the incentive award. 
Surveillance can be changed drastically by the admin- 
istrator and the contractor must respond to it. Because 
surveillance is a nonreimbursable cost, it is effective; 
however, it is an indirect and expensive cost to the 
administrator. 
4. State-of-the-art improvement. In the design of elec- 
tronic devices, substantial development cost is often 
required so that certain parameters may be advanced 
beyond the currently available values. If the additional 
development cost for a particular parameter is linear 
with respect to the value achieved, the a priori proba- 
bility density function (when the only restriction is the 
tolerance specifications) must be determined. The follow- 
ing example attempts to provide a method for determin- 
ing the a priori probability density function. 
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Assume that the parameter x is specified to be between 
0 and B, and that the state-of-the-art value of this pa- 
rameter is -A. Then, the development cost is 
and the expected net profit is 
which is a negative expected payoff function. 
With the prescribed procedure, it can be shown that, 
for the condition 4k,/kd 2 B2, 
p ( r )  = - B + - 2k, kd (i -- x), O < x < B  (50) 
Otherwise, 
which is also valid for the case when no upper limit is 
specified (as B, in this case, becomes idnity). The same 
equation indicates that when k, = 0, the probability 
density function approaches a delta function, p(x)+6(x). 
This fact indicates that the cost of improvement is the 
result of development alone, and that this cost is mini- 
mal when the parameter barely meets the requirement. 
When k, is finite (nonzero), however, the probability 
density function tends to spread toward a higher x in a 
declining manner, depending upon the k, to k d  ratio. 
The reason for this spread is that the idealized proba- 
bility density function cannot be achieved at a finite 
cost, and the contractor tends to protect himself by 
expending additional effort to assure meeting the mini- 
mum requirements. These results tend to agree with 
observations made under actual conditions. (This ex- 
ample of isolated strategy perhaps clarifies the remark 
in the introduction to this report regarding the uncanny 
manner in which deliveries are biased toward the low 
performance side of a specifkation.) 
Figure 11 shows the probability density function for 
various k, to kd ratios. 
As with the previous examples, there is a lack of sensi- 
tivity to the parameters. 
B 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x 
Fig. 1 1. Probability density function curves for various 
kJkd ratios; state-of-the-art improvement 
5. State-of-the-art improvement with linear incentive 
award. Consider the case of state-of-the-art improvement 
with a specified incentive award whose formula is 
r(x) = k,x, O l x l B  
The relationship between the development cost func- 
tion and the incentive award function is illustrated in 
Fig. 12. 
Accordingly, 
and the basic probability density function equation is 
RAN 33-439 as 
SPECIFIED 
TOLERANCE 
LIMITS 1 
PROFIT 
I 
B 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x --+- 
-------- 
krx - kd(x +A)  
DEVELOPMENT COST 
\ 
Fig. 13. ?refit-loss diagram, k, = kd 
-A 0 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x ---+ 
Fig. 12. Relationship between development cost 
and incentive award functions 
B subject to the condition that 
4kc 
Ak - -> BZ 
There are three distinct cases to be considered in this 
example. The first case is k ,  = kd = k.  In this case, the 
0 5 x 5 B regardless of the values of k ,  and k.  
where 
probability density function is rectangular p ( x )  = 1/B, Ak = I k ,  - kd I 
In the marginal case when 4k,/Ak = B2, the probability 
This result can be verified with the profit-loss diagram 
shown in Fig. 13. The maximum profit (more appropri- 
ately identified as the minimum loss in this case) occurs 
far as the contractor is concerned, there is no preference 
as to the value of x delivered, provided it is within the 
tolerance limits. 
density function reduces to 
throughout the entire permissible range 0 5 x 5 B.  As p(x )  = -& - ;) > O j X 5 B  (55) 2 
which is a declining right-angled triangle probability 
density function. 
When 4k,/Ak < B2, the probability density function The second case for consideration is k ,  < kd, and from 
Eq. (531, will remain the same as the form given in Eq. (55). 
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where h is a function of the k, to hk ratio and is found 
to be 
v2 
b=2(-&) , hk > 0 
In the special case when k, = 0, the probability density 
function approaches a delta function at x = 0. As can be 
seen in the profit-loss diagram of Fig. 14, the minimum 
loss for this case occurs at x = 0 with the specified range. 
The last case to be considered is k, > k d  and from 
Eq. (53L 
It is apparent that the probability density function for 
this case is the mirror image of the second case of this 
example with respect to B/2,  provided that the upper 
limit of B is finite. 
The profit-loss diagram for this case is shown in Fig. 15. 
The maximum profit occurs at x = B, which indicates 
that p(x)+6(x - B )  when k, is equal to zero. 
The results of this example are summarized in three 
sets of probability density function curves. These curves 
are given in Figs. 16-18. As with previous examples, 
there is a lack of sensitivity to the parameters. 
6. State-of-the-art improvement with linear incentive 
+*(x--+), O S x S B  (57) award (current parameter > O).The case of state-of-the- 
art improvement with linear incentive award (current 
parameter > 0) is similar to the case described in Sec- 
tion IX-Ad; the only difference is. that the current practi- 
cal limit of the parameter exceeds the minimum tolerance 
specification; i.e., x = 0. Graphically, the development 
cost and the incentive award functions are related as 
shown in Fig. 19. 
dx) = 2k, 
subject to the same condition 
4kc - > B2 
hk - 
as in the second case of this example. 
PROF1 T 
/ 
/ t 
rofit-loss diagram, k, < kd rofitloss diagra 
33-439 9 
( I  NCREASI N G  
A k c o  MAGNITUDE) T 
-A 0 6 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x- 
Fig. 9 6. Probability density function curves for constant 
k,, - co < Ak < 00; state-of-the-art improvement with 
incentive award strategy 
In this case, 
P 
-A 0 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x ---P 
6 
Fig. 17. Probability density function curves for various 
k,/Ak ratios, kr < kd; state-of-the-art improvement with 
incentive award strategy 
I =LA [krx - 
J A  
It follows that 
p ( x )  = - + - B 2k, 
k d  ( B  - A ) z  +- O < x < A  4kc B ' 
k d  A' +-- A < x < B  4kc B ' 
There are three distinct cases to be considered in this 
example. The fist case is kr = k d  = k. The probability 
density function for this case is readily obtainable from 
Eq. (59). 
(58) 
(59) 
1 kx 
p ( x )  = - - - B 2k, O < x < A  
(60) A < x < B  
1 k A  
B 4kcB ' +- - - 
provided that the following inequality 
7c, > A ( B  - +) 
k - 2  
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-A 
kc = C  
0 B/2 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x ---b 
SPEC1 fl ED 
TOLERANCE 
LIMITS 1 
Fig. 18. Probability density function curves for various 
kJAk ratios, k, > kd; state-of-the-art improvement with 
incentive award strutegy I I 
0 
AL 33-439 
A 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x --d.. 
Fig. 19. Relationship between development cost 
and incentive award functions, A > 0 
B 
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is satisfied. Otherwise, the slope of the curve in the first 
segment increases in the manner shown in Fig. 20 with 
the ultimate probability density function being rectangu- 
lar between the limits A and B as k,/k equals zero. This 
result can be verified with the corresponding profit-loss 
diagram given in Fig. 21. The maximum profit occurs for 
i l l  x between A and B .  
The second case for consideration is k, < kd. By 
rearranging Eq. (59), one obtains 
1 AkB kdA kdA2 k,x 
p ( x )  = - +- -- +-+- O S x S A  B 4kc 2kc 4kcB 2 k c ’  
1 AkB kdA2 A h  -+- +--- A S x S B  B 4k, 4k,B 2k, ’ 
(61) 
A 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x ---L 
B 
Fig. 20. Probability density function curves for various 
k,/k ratios, k, = k d  = k; state-of-the-art improvement 
with incentive award strategy, A > 0 
PROFIT -------- 
LOSS 
0 B 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x 4 
Fig. 21. ProfiPloss diagram, k, = kd, A > 0 
where Ak = kd - k,. 
Evidently, both segments of the probability density 
function are linear functions of x. 
It can be proved with elementary algebra that the 
following inequalities prevail: 
Therefore, the general shape of the probability density 
function is as shown in Fig. 22. 1% addition, depending 
upon the value of the k,  to Ak ratio, a family of curves 
can be constructed (Fig. 23). With k, = 0, the probability 
density function becomes a delta function 6 (x - A ) .  The 
profit-loss diagram corresponding to this case is given 
in Fig. 24. 
A special case of interest is when k,  = 0; i.e., no in- 
centive award provision. In this case, 
A B 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x 
Fig. 22. General shape of probability density 
function curve; k, < k d ,  A > 0 
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1 kdB kdA' kdx +-+--- A < x I B  - - B 4k, 4k,B 2k, ' 
The probability density function curves and the asso- 
ciated profit-loss diagram are shown in Figs. 25 and 26, 
respectively. 
The third case under consideration is k,  > kd. The set 
of probability density function equations for this particu- 
lar case is identical to the one given in Eq. (60).  How- 
ever, since the condition for the magnitude of k,  and kd 
is reversed, the following inequalities become true: 
A sketch of the probability density function curves for 
various k, /Ak and the profit-loss diagram are presented 
in Figs. 27 and 28. And, as with previous examples, there 
is a lack of sensitivity to the parameters. 
B. Mixed Strategies 
1. Incentive award and suroeillance. Consider a com- 
bined strategy of incentive award and surveillance such 
that 
and 
with x = & B being the imposed limits of the parameter. 
The expected payoff is 
\ LOSS 
0 A 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x ----d 
Fig. 23. Probability density function curves 
for various k,; k, < k d r  A > 8 
B 
Fig. 24. Profit-loss diagram, k, < k d r  A > 0 
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Fig. 25. Probability density function curves for 
various k,/kd ratios, k, = 0, A > 0 
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I 
DEVELOPMENT 
k 
Ak 
-- -0, S(x-B) 
A 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x -e 
Fig. 27. Probability density function curves fer 
various k,; k,. > k d ,  A > 0 
B 
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-kd(x - A) 
Fig. 28. Profit-loss diagram, k, >kd, A > 0 
The combined function of ~ ( x )  and s(x) is depicted in 
Fig. 29. If this combined function is denoted by a single 
notation v(x) ,  then 
and, according to Eq. (40), 
p(x) = - + - 2k, 2B 
where ~ ( x )  represents the combined strategy of incentive 
award and surveillance. This probability density function 
is valid under the condition 
4k,B3 + 3k, 
k c >  = kco 6 
The probability density function for the case when 
k, < k,, can be obtained by the method described in the 
incentive award case. The necessary mathematical ma- 
nipulation, however, is quite tedious. 
6 
29. strategy curves: (a) incentive 
tegy; (b) surveillance strategy; (c) incentive 
$ u ~ e i l l a n ~ e  strategies 
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The general form of the probability density function is 
p ( r )  = c, (1 - q) + C,(bZ - X Z ) ,  0 5  1x1 Ib 
= 0, elsewhere (65) 
in which C1, C2, and b are constants that are best evalu- 
ated by the graphical method. Briefly, these constants 
can be obtained by the simultaneous solving of the fol- 
lowing pair of partial derivatives: 
where E is the expected payoff of Eq. (63) subject to 
the restrictions that 
( C ,  (1 - +) dx + C2(bz - x 2 ) k  = 0.5 (66) 
J o  
1( 
E 
6 
u" 4 
E 
4 t, 
and that C1,Cz, and b are non-negative. In addition, 
b < B.  
A typical graphical solution for these constants is 
shown in Fig. 30. The intersection between the curves 
within the shaded region bounded by the curves C ,  = 0, 
b = 0, and that of Eq. (66) with C, = 0 is the only correct 
solution. With the knowledge of C ,  and b, C, can be 
computed readily. 
The same solution can be obtained readily with the aid 
of a digital computer through the area subtraction 
method described in Section VIII. Several families of 
curves for various ratios of k, and k, with respect to the 
cost factor k,, were obtained with the computer and are 
given in Figs. 31-38. Examination of these curves indi- 
cates a general lack of sensitivity of the resultant proba- 
bility density function both for the variation of k, with 
respect to k, and k, and for the ratio of k, and k, with 
constant k,. 
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Fig. 31. Probability density function curves for incentive 
award and surveillance strategies; k, = 1, k, = 0.25 
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Fig. 32. Probability density function curves for incentive 
award and surveillance strategies; k, = 1, k, = 0.5 
I . !  
d 
z 
U 
Z 
0. 
1 .o 
? 
& 
2 
z 
a Y 
t 
i 
B 
2 0.5 
P 
0 
CURVE COST 
INDEX FACTOR k, 
0 0.500 
1 1 .ooo 
2 1 .m 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x --P 
Fig. 33. Probability density function curves for incentive 
award and surveillance strategies; k, = 1 , k, = 0.75 
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Fig. 34. Probability density function curves for incentive 
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Fig. 36. Probability density function curves for incentive 
surveillance strategies; k,. = 1,  k, = 1.5 
R ~ ~ ~ U M  33-439 
2.' 
1 .  
A 
-2 
5 
F 
W z 
> 
a 
5 
t 
Q, 
P 
1 .  
n 
i 
B 
0- 
0. 
CURVE COST 
INDEX FACTOR kc 
0 0.500 
1 1 .om 
2 1.500 
3 2.000 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x ----c 
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Fig. 38. Probability density function curves for incentive 
award and surveillance strategies; k, = 91,  k, = 2 
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2. State-of-the-art improvement with incentive award 
and surveillance. Consider another mixed strategy ex- 
ample involving state-of-the-art improvement with both 
incentive award and surveillance. By use of the tolerance 
limits, development cost function, incentive award func- 
tion, and a surveillance function of the form 
s(x) = ks(x--B)2, for 0 5 x 5 B 
as shown in Fig. 39, we have 
Although the resultant probability density function for 
this example can be obtained analytically, the process is 
tedious and time consuming because of the added com- 
plexity. Therefore, the detailed analytical solution for 
the probability density function is not presented in this 
report. Instead, computer solutions for various combina- 
A 0 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x --E- 
B 
Fig. 39. Relationship between development cost, incen- 
tive award, and surveillance for a mixed strategy in- 
volving state-of-the-art improvement 
tions of values of cost factors are plotted. These plots are 
given in Figs. 4050. As in the previous cases, there is 
evidence of a general lack of sensitivity in the probability 
density function for this mixed strategy. 
3. State-of-the-art improvement with surveillance. The 
example of state-of-the-art improvement with surveillance 
is a special case of the preceding example with k,. = 0 
and is intended to show the effect on the resultant proba- 
bility density functions of increased surveillance. 
The strategic function used for this example is graphi- 
cally presented in Fig. 51. The nominal value for the 
surveillance function in this case is 1. The resulting 
probability density function curves, with various values 
of k,, are plotted in Fig. 52. 
As shown in Fig. 52, signscant improvement in the 
resultant probability density function can be realized if 
substantial surveillance effort is made by the administrator. 
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Fig. 40. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
the-art improvement with incentive award and surveil- 
lance strategies; k, = 0.1, k, = 1, kd = 1 
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Fig. 41. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
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lance strategies; k,. = 0.2, k, = 1, kd = 1 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x --D 
Fig. 42. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
the-art improvement with incentive award and surveil- 
lance strategies; k,. = 0.5, k, = 'I, k d  = 1 
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Fig. 43. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
the-art improvement with incentive award and surveil- 
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Fig. 46. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
the-art improvement with incentive award and surveil- 
lance strategies; k, = 10, k, = 1, k d  = 1 
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Fig. 48. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
the-art improvement with incentive award and surveil- 
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Fig. 49. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
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Fig. 50. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
the-art improvement with incentive award and surveil- 
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X. Summary and Conclusions 
This effort was directed to establishing probability 
density functions of a hardware performance parameter 
delivered by a contractor to a specification. Because 
sufficient data would not be available to estimate this 
probability density function experimentally, it was neces- 
sary to derive a priori probability density functions from 
assumed axioms determined from an investigation of 
contractor motivation and behavior. 
The analysis began with the realization that the con- 
tractor would act to enhance his own self-interests. One 
of the early conclusions of the investigation of contractor 
self-interests, motivation, and behavior was that profit is 
not a universal motivator, but that motivation is a many 
faceted problem. After examining many of these moti- 
vators, it was decided that some aid primarily in the 
selection of the contractor while others are concerned 
with what manipulations will motivate the contractor 
after the contract is placed. 
While many of these motivations exist to varying 
degrees and are important to the success of a contract, 
it was found that they were not free parameters for the 
administrator to manipulate. It was concluded, however, 
that whether or not the free manipulable parameters exist 
is very important to the success of the contract and how 
it proceeds and that they affect the parameters of 
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Fig. 52. Probability density function curves-state-of- 
the-art improvement with surveillance strategy; k, = 1, 
k d  1 1 
those motivators that can be manipulated. For instance, 
the glamour of the work is certainly a prime motivator to 
the contract success but is intrinsic to the work and 
cannot be created by the administrator. If it exists, how- 
ever, the amount of substitute motivation required to 
accomplish the desired result is less. 
On the other hand, survival of the principals is a factor 
that can be changed during the execution of the contract; 
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therefore, surveillance becomes a very effective strategy 
that is controllable by the administrator. Profit as a 
motivator enters in the problem, but its effectiveness as 
a strategy depends very heavily on how the contractor 
management emphasizes it. If its emphasis permeates 
the organizational structure, then it is an effective tool. 
If profit is only emphasized at the top levels, then it is 
not so effective. It was concluded that the assessment of 
the contractor’s motivators during the precontract phase 
is a very important factor in determining the strategies 
to be applied to the contractor during the execution 
phase of the contract to obtain the desired results. 
A short discussion concerning the random state of 
nature, the “unintelligent adversary,” was presented. 
It was assumed that without the random state of nature 
there was no problem to be solved. 
The assumption was made that the discussion of con- 
tractor self-interests, motivation, and behavior described 
a game between two players, who had an unintelligent 
adversary. From this fact, it was necessary to determine 
the rules under which they were playing. With this 
foundation, a formal statement of the problem was 
possible in a more or less axiomatic approach. With these 
rules, other conclusions not obvious from the description 
of the observed play were considered possible. 
Once this formulation was accepted, the solution of the 
problem was undertaken. The solution involved determin- 
ing appropriate, yet rather difficult, net payoff functions 
for the contractor and using the calculus of variations 
with integral and inequality constraints. New techniques 
for the solution were developed; although equivalent 
techniques developed by Koopman were found. This 
equivalence was shown. 
After the methodology was developed, numerous con- 
trived examples were given using both isolated and 
mixed strategies for manipulation of the contractor. 
These were parameterized for various incentive-to-cost 
ratios, etc. Both types of examples were investigated to 
determine the sensitivity of the resultant probability 
density functions to the parameters. A uniform finding in 
all of the examples was that there was a decisive lack of 
sensitivity to the parameters in affecting the resultant 
probability density functions. This conclusion was a 
complete surprise in that it was opposite to that expected 
when this research was begun. Preconditioning by the 
prevalence of incentive contracting had caused the 
supposition that this was an effective tool, and that the 
results sought would bear this out. For the particular 
factors investigated, this simply was not true. 
The resources available for contract manipulation are 
simply not enough to cause substantial changes in the 
resultant probability density functions. Without realizing 
this, contract administrators use this strategy and expect 
good results. When good results are not forthcoming, the 
administrator unjustly blames the contractor. As a result, 
many contractors rightfully refuse to accept incentive 
award contracts. This analysis supports this reaction. 
Surveillance was another major isolated strategy con- 
sidered. This strategy also exhibited a lack of sensitivity 
to its parameters. This lack of sensitivity is, however, not 
as restrictive as was the example using the incentive 
award. Surveillance can be changed by large factors by 
the administrator more or less at his initiation and 
demand. The contractor must more or less endure and 
respond to this. Since this results in a nonreimbursable 
cost to the contractor, it becomes rather effective. The 
administrator must be willing to accept the cost of 
contractor surveillance as it influences his own operations. 
For any strategy, the prize offered must be overwhelm- 
ing to have any pronounced effect for the stated objec- 
tive. If mixed strategies are used with a fixed resource 
for incentives, none of the strategies is likely to yield any 
pronounced effect for the stated objective. An implication, 
verified in the analysis, is that mixed strategies drawn 
from a fixed resource “water down” each factor below 
the threshold of effectiveness. Stated otherwise, too many 
separate incentives based on a fixed resource accom- 
plishes nothing. If funds are limited, at most, a single 
incentive strategy should be attempted. 
The conclusion, after all this investigation is that sur- 
veillance is the best strategy that the administrator can 
use. By surveillance, close and well-planned surveillance 
is meant, since the sensitivity for this strategy was as 
low as all others as a parameter in the analysis. However, 
it is the one most directly felt by contractor personnel, 
and it is a direct cost to the contractor in that it detracts 
from other possible profits. Since all incentives have 
limitations, one must recognize those of surveillance. 
Every Alumni Association realizes that it is important to 
select a good coach, but surveillance or harassment (i.e., 
burning him in effigy) only produces a level of results 
commensurate with what he is willing to pay in terms of 
health and personal discomfort; only an infinite reward-to- 
cost ratio will guarantee that perfect 10-0-0 season record. 
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To obtain satisfactory contract results as outlined, the 
following cardinal rules are offered for which no substi- 
tutes were found in this analysis: 
(1) Know your contractors and know them well. 
(2) Maintain very close surveillance over your con- 
tractors. 
In the way of self-criticism, the above analysis was 
concerned largely with the reactions of the contractor to 
various manipulations to obtain “satisfactory” probability 
density functions. Consideration of this problem is a 
large investigation in itself, in that “satisfactory” proba- 
bility density functions from a technical point of view 
may cost the administrator far beyond what he is willing 
to pay. (This perhaps should be the subject of another 
investigation.) 
One of the prime considerations in deriving a priori 
probability density functions for contractor performance 
was that sufficient data would not be available to experi- 
mentally estimate a probability density function. After 
the analysis was done it was realized that some of the 
cost factors to the contractor are just as illusive to obtain 
as an experimentally estimated probability density func- 
tion; thus, in some regards, one problem has been 
exchanged for another. However, knowledge of the trends 
and the sensitivities of various strategies, which is quite 
beneficial, has been obtained for directing the admin- 
istrator. 
A few words about the modeling of this problem are 
appropriate. Because of the nature of this problem, it is 
not a simple task to formulate an adequate model. As with 
most analyses, the modeling always can be questioned 
when examined closely. The fact that the applicability of 
the solution derived from the model depends entirely 
upon the accuracy and adequacy of the model is fully 
realized. In this particular investigation, although the 
modeling is perhaps inadequate, the trend and conclu- 
sions that were obtained are uniform, consistent, and 
generally in harmony with rational human behavior and 
common business practice. It is believed that the results 
of this investigation are in most aspects reasonable and, 
certainly so, within the restrictions of the assumptions 
made. Additionally, it is not felt that the conclusions will 
change substantially with other models. 
As a final statement, it is not believed that incentive 
contracting is an effective tool in obtaining a hardware 
parameter to a specification; however, close surveillance 
is considered to be effective. This should not be con- 
strued to mean that either of these conclusions apply to 
contracts with a different purpose, although they are 
suspected to apply. 
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Appendix A contains a condensed flow diagram (Fig. 
A-1) and a listing of the program, including plotting sub- 
cedure outlined in Section VIII-B. 
given by 
routines (Table A-1). The program is based on the pro- v(x) = zzvz(x) + z,v,(x) + Z4v4(2) + &V5(x) 
+ Z,V,(x) + Z,V,(x) + ZsVs(x) (A-2) 
This program is adaptable to a wide variety of strategic 
functions with linear incentive award, surveillance, and 
development cost. Up to seven segments can be accom- 
modated to allow for those strategic functions with abrupt 
changes, or for better approximation should nonlinear 
incentive award functions be desired. The strategic 
function is read into the computer in the form of data to 
eliminate the need of modifying the main computer 
statements and recompiling every time a new strategic 
function is used. 
where Vi(.) has the identical form of Eq. (A-1). In Eq. 
(A-2), 2, through 2, are again binary coefficients that are 
either zero or one, depending upon the number of seg- 
ments defined in the strategic function. In the triangular 
incentive award case, (Fig. A-3), two segments exist so 
that only 2, and 2, are equal to one, and the remaining 
coefficients are zero. Here, Segment 1 and the last seg- 
ment appear as a horizontal line with zero magnitude for 
better presentations. This procedure should be used for 
all cases. 
The computer program is written so that h e a r  incen- 
tive award, development cost, and surveillance are inde- 
pendently established through input data cards (Table 
A-2). Basically, the mixed strategic function v(x) is pro- 
grammed in the computer in the form given by 
All the binary coefficients and characteristic constants 
for all segments are read into the computer on input data 
cards. In addition, the boundary values of the relevant 
segments denoted by B(1) through B ( N )  ( N  5 10) as shown 
in Fig. A-3 are also read into the computer as data. 
where 2 ,  Zd, and 2, are the binary coefficients (true or 
false) associated with incentive award, development cost, 
and surveillance portions of the function, respectively; 
and they assume a value of either zero or one. The various 
Qs and X s  in the same equation are characteristic con- 
stants that define the individual constituent functions. 
Thus, if the mixed strategic function does not involve an 
incentive award, the coefficient 2, will be made zero; 
otherwise, it will be one, and so forth. The significance 
of the various constants is clearly illustrated in Fig. A-2. 
xd3)  There are additional data cards required for establish- 
ing grid lines of the plotted probability density function 
curves and for curve identification. The grid lines and 
the coordinate system for the plotted curve are shown in 
Fig. A-4. 
To establish the graph format and the desired labeling 
of the grid lines, the following variables are used in the 
data entry of the plotting subroutine. 
NGX = 1010 NLX 
NGY = 1010 NLY 
NLX = number of spaces for label on the x-axis 
NLY = number of spaces for label on the y-axis 
The computer program also makes provision for strate- - ~ 
gies with a more irregular form. For example, the tri- 
angular incentive award function that has been used 
so frequently in this report consists of two segments of 
For the example shown in Fig. A-4, the following 
variables are used: 
straight lines, each of which has a different slope value. 
To cope with the possibility of irregularly formed strat- 
egies, the internally stored strategic function is actually 
NGX = 4040 
NGY = 5050 
NLX = 4 
NCY = 5 
49 
=. 
ESTABLISH 
INITIAL kc 
IDENTIFY 
STRATEGIC 
FUNCTION 
(READ IN DATA) 
COMPUTE 
UNRESTRICTED 
PROBABI LlTY DENSITY iFUNCTION 
f 
I I 
I 1 
N O  
COMPUTE 
MODIFIED PROBABILITY 
DENSITY FUNCTION 
STORE PROBABILITY 
DENSITY FUNCTION 
UPDATE kc 
(k, = k, + A k,) 
N O  -
t 
I S  kc > Q? 
I 
COST 
\ 
k 
INCENTIVE 
AWARD 
'd3 xr3 XI 
HARDWARE PARAMETER x - 
Fig. A-2. Relationship of various constants for the in- 
centive award, development cost, and surveillance 
strategies 
I 
Z3 = 1 Z4 through 5 = 0 
I ' / \  I 
YES1 IS THERE MORE 
FUNCTION TO 
BE PLOTTED? 
SEGMENT 3 SEGMENT 4 SEGMENT 1 SEGMENT 2 
Fig. A-3. Triangular incentive award strategy 
Fig. A-1 . Condensed flow diagram of program 
50 JP L TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 33-439 
2.: 
2.c 
- 
d 
Z 
Q 
P y 1.: 
z 
> 
!= 
Z 
n 
> 
= - 1.c 
VI 
w 
I- 
2 
9 
P 
0.: 
( 
e(1) 8(2) N3) N4) BQ 
Fig. A-4. Probability density function curves 
and coordinate system 
51 
SIBFTC DO1701 
C SOURCE STATEMENTS - DISTRIBUTION PLOTTING PROGRAM 
- DIMENSION E X (  501) 
DIMENSION D I S T ( 5 0 1 9 8 )  
COMMON / 2 0 1 7 0 1 /  DC K C I M ~ F X ~ D I S T ~ T  I T 1  F 
U ( X ) = Z 2 * ( Z S 2 * C K S * Q S 2 * ~ X ~ A S 3 2 ~ / ~ A S l 2 - A S 2 2 ~ - Z ~ 2 * C K D * Q D 2 * ~ X - A D 3 Z ~ / ~ A D  
112-AD22) -ZH2*CKH*(X-AH)* (X-AH))  +73*JJS? *CKS+QS3*( X - A S ? ?  ) / ( A S 1  ? - AS7 
13) -ZD3*CKD*QD3* (X-AD33) / (AD l3 -AD23) -ZH3*CKH*(X-AH)* (X -A~) )+24* (ZS4  
l * C K S * Q S 4 * ( X - A S 3 4 ) / ( A S l 4 - A S 2 4 ) - Z D 4 * C K ~ * Q D 4 * ( X - A D 3 4 ) / (  AD14-AD24)-ZH4 
l*CKH*(X-AH)*(X-AH))+Z5*(ZS5*CKS*QS5*(X~AS35)/(ASl5-AS2~)-ZD5*CKD*Q 
lD5+(X-AD35)/(AD15-AD25)-ZH5*CKH*(X-AH)*(X-AH))+Z6*(ZS6*CKS*QS6*(X- 
1AD36) / (AS16-A526) -ZD6*CKD*QD6* (X-AD36) / (AD~6-AD26) -ZH6*CKH*(X-AH)*  
1 (X-AH) )+Z7*(257*CKS*QS7*(X-AS37) / (AS17-AS27)-ZD7*CKD+QD7+( X-AD37 i/ 
l(AD17-AD27)-ZH7*CKH*(X-AH)*(X-AH))+Z8*(ZS8*CKS*QS8*(X-A538)/(ASl8- 
l A S 2 8 ) - Z D 8 * C K D * Q D 8 * ( X - A D 3 8 ) / ( A D 1 8 - A D 2 8 ) - Z H 8 * C K H * ( X - A H ~ * ~ X ~ A H ) )  
1 READ(5,lOOO) NICKD,CKHICKS~DCKC,CKCMX,AHIUXMAXIUXMIN,~B(I),I=~~~) 
R E A D ( 5 9 1 0 0 3 )  
~ ) ~ A S ( L J ~ ) , A S ( L , ~ ) ~ A S ( L ~ ~ ) ~ L = ~ , ~ )  
1000 FORMAT( 1 5 / 8 F 9 0 3 / ( F I 2 . 5 )  ) 
1 0 0 3  FORMAT( l lF6.2)  
C 
READ(59 1 2 0 0 )  T I T L E  
WRITE(6,IZOO) T I T L E  
AS22=AS ( 2 92 ) 
1200 FORMAT(12A6) 
C 
A S 2 5 = A S ( 5 t 2 )  
AS26=AS(692)  
A S 2 7 = A S ( 7 r 2 )  
AS28=AS(892)  
AS32=AS(293)  
A S 3 3 = A S ( 3 r 3 )  
AS34=AS(493)  
AS35ZAS ( 5 9 3 
AS36=AS(6,3)  
A53 /=AS ( 7 9 3 )  
AS38=AS(893)  
AD12=AD ( 2  9 1 )  
AD13zAD ( 3  9 1 I 
AD14=AD(4,1) 
AD15zAD ( 5  9 1  1 
AD16=AD(691)  
AD18zAD ( 8 9 1) 
AD72zAD ( 2  97 1 
AD23=AD(392)  
AD24=AD ( 4 9 2 ) 
AD25xAD (5 92 1 
AD26zAD ( 6  92 ) 
AD27=AD ( 7 92 
AD28=AD(892)  
AD32=AD(2,3) 
AD33=AD(393)  
AD34zAD ( 4  9 3 
AD35=AD(593)  
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Table A-1 (contd) 
AD36=AD(6,3) 
AD37=AD(7931 
AD38zAD ( 893 1 
ZDZ=ZD( 2 1 
ZH7=ZH ( 7 1 
_. - ZH8=ZH( 8 )  
2s2=zs ( 2 
AS16=AS(6 9 1 
AS17=AS ( 7 9 1 1  
NN=N-1 
M= 0 
CKC=Oo 
IF(CKCeGToCKCMX1 GO TO 4 0 0  
M=M+1 
AR EA=O 
QO 1 0 0  I=2.NN 
5 CKC=CKC+DCKC 
BLOW=B( I )  
BHGH=B( I + 1 )  
22=0. 
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Z6=0 e 
Z 7=0 B 
28100 
IF(JeEQe2) GO TO 15 
IF(IaEQo3) GO TO 20 
IF(I.EQ.4) GO TO 25 
IF(I.EQ.5) GO TO 30 
IF(IeEQ.6) GO TO 35 
IF(ImEQ.7) GO TO 40 
IF(IoEQe+81 GO T O  45 
15 z2=1. 
20 2 3 ~ 1 .  
GO TO 60 
GO TO 60 
30 Z5=1. 
GO TO 60 
35 26=1m 
GO TO 60 
40 27x1. 
45 2 8 ~ 1 .  
60 DXS=(BHGH-BLOWI/2. 
GO TO 60 
FI l=U ( BHGH 1 +U ( BLOW 1 
FI 2=U( BLOW+DXS 1 
FI 3=0e 
FI=DXS*(FI1+4e*FI2)/3e 
FI 2=0m 
62 PI3=FI2+F13 
TDXS=DXS 
DXS= e 5*DXS 
X=BLOW+DXS 
64 FI2=FI2+U(X) 
X,= X+ T D X S 
IF(X-BHGH)64*64,66 
66 FI P=DXS* ( F I 1+4e*FI 2+2m*F I3 1 /3* 
IF(ABS(FIP-FI )-.001*ABS(FIP) I80980968 
80 AREA=AR EA+F I P 
100 CONTINUE 
165 WRITE(69170)M 
175 WRITE(69180)VLM 
170 FORMAT(4H M =,I21 
180 FORMAT(8H LAMDA =9F12m8) 
VLM=(1.- .5*AREA/CKC)/ (B(NN)-B(2)  1 
C 
X=B( 1) 
DX=.002*(B(N)-B(1) 1 
DO 200 K=lr501 
z2=oe 
Z 3=0 0 
Z4=0 e 
Z5=0 e 
Z6=0e 
Z7=0. 
Z8=0 B 
IF(XeLEaR(2)) GO TO 115 
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table A-1 (contd) 
I F ( x ~ I F , R ( ~ ~ !  r,n TO 970 
I F ( X e L E o B ( 4 ) )  GO TO 1 2 5  
I F ( X o l F e B ( 5 ) )  GO TO 130 
I F ( X e L E e B ( 6 ) )  GO TO 1 3 5  
I F ( X e L E * G ( t ) )  GO TO 1 4 0  
I F ( X e L E e B ( 8 ) )  GO TO 1 4 5  
I F ( X e L E e B ( 9 ) )  GO TO 1 5 0  
I F ( X e L E o B ( 1 0 ) )  GO TO 1 5 5  
C 
1 1 5  PDF=Oe 
1 2 0  Z 2 = l o  
IF(NNeEQ.2) GO TO 1 5 5  
PDF=eS*U(X)/CKC+VLM 
1 2 5  Z3=1. 
IF(NN.EQ.SI GO TO 1 5 5  
PDF=oS*U(X)/CKC+VLM 
-- GO TO 1 6 0  
1 3 0  Z4=1. 
IF (NNoEQe41  GO TO 1 5 5  
PDF=e5*U(X)/CKC+VLM 
1 3 5  2 5 ~ 1 .  
IF(NN.EQ.5) GO TO 1 5 5  
PDF=.5*U(X)/CKC+VLM 
GO TO 1 6 0  
1 4 0  2 6 ~ 1 .  
IF(NN.EQ.6) GO TO 1 5 5  
PDF=*5*U(X)/CKC+VLM 
GO TO 160 
1 4 5  ?7=1. 
IF(NN.EQ.7) GO T O  1 5 5  
PDF=.5*U ( X ) /CKC+VLM 
GO TO 1 6 0  
1 5 0  2 8 ~ 1 .  
IF(NN.EQ.8) GO T O  1 5 5  
PDF=e5*U( X /CKC+VLM 
GO TO 160 
_____ 1 6 0  D I  - ST ( KI M)=PDF 
EX ( K  ) = X  
155  PDF=O. 
- X=X+DX 
200 CONTINUE 
3 6 0  FORMAT( 37H 1 I S T I N G  OF DIST ( IJNt I )MPFNSATFDI I 
2 4 0  FORMAT(1H r5F12.8)  
r 
SC=.5*UXMIN/CKC+VLM 
I F ( S C o G E o 0 e )  GO TO 5 
SUMM=Oe 
DBASL=o5*(e5*UXMAX/CKC+VLM) 
3 1 0  BAS1 T=BASCT +DBAS I 
GO TO 3 2 5  
- 3 2 0  BASLTzBASLT-DBASL 
325 DO 350 K = l r 5 0 1  
FXMOD=DIST(K,M)-BASt T 
IF(FXMODoLE.0.) GO T O  3 5 0  
SUMM=SUMM+FXMOD 
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3 5 0  CONTINUE 
C 
CHECK=SUMM*DX-l. 
IF(ABS(CHECK).LT.oOOl) GO TO 375  
DBASL =DBASL/2 
SUMMZO 0 
IF(CHECKeGT.0.) GO T O  3 1 0  
GO TO 3 2 6  
3 7 5  BASLN=BASLT 
3 7 8  WRITE(69379)BASLN 
3 7 9  FORMAT(8H BASLN =,F12.8) 
C 
DO 3 8 0  K = l r 5 0 1  
DIST(K,M)=DIST(K,M)-BASLN 
IF(DIST(K,M).ST.Oe) GO TO 380 
D I  ST (K,M)=O. 
3 8 0  CONTINUE 
410 FORMAT(30H L I S T I N G  OF D I S T  (COMPENSATED)) 
GO TO 5 
400 CONTINUE 
C 
EXTERNAL SO1702 
C A L L  SO0202 ( 5 0 1 7 0 2 )  
GO T O  1 
END 
BIBFTC DO1702 
SUEROUTINE SO1702 
C 
C PROGRAM NO. 017-02, REVISED 8 / 1 / 6 8  
C 
DIMENSION E X ( 5 0 1 ) , D I S T ( 5 0 1 , 8 )  
DIMENSION T I T L E (  1 2 )  
COMMON / 2 0 1 7 0 1 /  DCKC ,M, EX PDIST, T I TLE 
CALL SO0206 ( 5 0 1 r 5 0 1 ~ M ~ E X ~ D I S T ~ O ~ 2 4 0 )  
C A L L  ADV ( N T )  
C A L L  SETPL ( 0 )  
WRIT.E( 1 8 9 2 0 )  T I T L E  
20  FORMAT(1H r 1 2 A 6 )  
WRITE( 1 8 9 3 0 )  
30  FOR MAT(1H ,3X,5HCURVE,lOX,IlHCOST FACTOR/ lH 93X95HINDEX,14X,3HCKC) 
C 
C 
C 
CKC=O. 
DO 1 0 0  I = l , M  
I C = I - 1  
CKC=CKC+DCKC 
W R I T E ( 1 8 9 4 0 )  IC9CKC 
4 0  FORMAT(1H r169F20.31 
1 0 0  CONTINUE 
CALL RESPL 
RETURN 
56 
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Table A-l  (contd) 
RAIN _- J P L ~ J 2 6 4 0 0 0 ~ 3 6 0 1 0 ~ 0 ~ 5 0 0 8 5 ~ A  I C  I B J O B B - U B K  
DO0202 - EFN SOURCE STATEMENT - I F N ( S 1  - 
SUBROUTINE S002C2 (PLOT) 
C PROGRAC NO0 002-029 WRITTEN 2 / 1 6 / 6 6  
L 
CIMENSION C141 ,C1(41 ,BUF(1000) ,DATA(2 ,100)  
COMMON /A00202 /  BUF 
EXTERNAL PLOT 
CATA J1 /0/ 
C 
READ (5,101 3 2  
10 F O R f l A T ( l 4 1 5 1  
WRITE 16,111 3 2  
I F (  J2*EQoO) RETURN 
CALL CAMERA (KT,JZ)  
I F (  J l o E Q o O )  CALL SLABEL 
11 FORPAT ( 1H111415  1 
C 
C _-___ 
2 0  READ (59101  J3,NDATA,NGX,NGYpNLX,NLY 
2 1  FORMAT( l N 0 1 1 4 1 5  1 
WRITE (6.22)  J3rNDATAtNGX,NGY,NLXINLY 
I F ( J 3 - E Q o O )  RETURN 
C 
30 READ ( 5 , 4 0 1  I C l ( I ) r I = l , 4 )  
4 0  FORPAT ( 7 F l O T 8  1 
HR I TE I6 14 1 1 fC 1 ( I )11=1,4) 
4 1  FORMAT ( 1 H  1 7 f 1 0 . 3 )  
C 
I F 4 J l o N E o O )  CALL ADV ( N T )  
J l = l  
C 
CALL S C I N I T  ( EUFt 10001 C l r C i N T  1 
CALL BGRID (BUF,NGX,NGY,l) 
CALL PLAB (BUF,NLX16H(F7oZ),NLY,6H(F7oZ) 1 
C 
IFfNDATA.LEeO) GO TO 80 
C 
REAC (5 ,601  ( (DATA( I ,J ) , I=1121 ,JDLrNDATA)  
60 FORKAT(ZFlOo8)  
WRITE (6,611 f ( D A T A ( I I J ) , I = l , Z ) , J f L 1 N D A T A )  
6 1  FORMAT(1H ,2F10o3)  
L 
00 70 J=l,NGATA 
C 
C 
80 CALL PLOT 
. _ _ _ ~  
GO TC 20.- 
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- 3 9  C A L L  PPLOT (X,Y,B-U.E, 1 H 9 )  - -. __ . __ 
RETURN 
- . END ~. ....... - .. __ . .............. 
.. . .- cI--I .-_.__I .... 
~~. . . . . . . . . . . .  
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Table A-1 (contd) 
MAIN J P L ~ J 2 5 4 0 0 0 r 3 6 0 1 0 ~ 0 ~ 5 0 0 8 5 ~ A  IC I ~J0B-V 1-?!J2 
D002C6 - EFN SOURCE STATEMENT - I F N ( S 1  - 
SUBRCUTINE SO0206 ( N I N X ~ N C I X I Y ~ I N T R P ~ I A )  
c PROGRAH NO* 002-060 WRITTEN 2 / 1 5 / 6 7  
C 
DIMENSION X ( N ) 1 Y ( N i l ) r B U F 1 1 0 0 0 )  
COMFnON /A002C2/ BUF 
C 
co 20 I = l r N C  
DO 10 J=l,h'X 
10 CALL SGNPkT X (  J l  , Y f  JI I 1 tl3UF1 INTRP) 
CALL SINTRP (cui=) 
20 CALL SO0203 ( X ( I A ) r Y I I A 9 1 ) , 1 )  
CALL STERM I N T ~ B U F )  
-. _ ~ _ _ _  C 
RETURN 
END 
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Table A-2. Sequence of input data cards 
Card sequence 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0 
N+2 
N+3 
N +4 
N +5 
N+6 
N+7 
N+8 
N+9 
N S 1 0  
N+11 
N+12 
N+13 
N+14 
N+15 
Content Field Remarks 
Number of segments = N - 1, ( N S  10) 
Coefficients and constants for 1 st segment 
Coefficients and constants for 2nd segment 
Coefficients and constants far 3rd segment 
Coefficients and constants for 4th segment 
Coefficients and constants for 5th segment 
Coefficients and constants for 6th segment 
Coefficients and constants for 7th segment 
Coefficients and constants for 8th segment 
Grid lines and labeling 
Graph coordinate 
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sis itter 
The purpose of Appendix B is to provide experimental 
verification of the analysis presented in this report by 
comparing (1) data of hardware parameters delivered 
to a specifkation and (2) data of the contract circum- 
stances to data that would be predicted by the analysis. 
The hardware parameter chosen for this comparison was 
the power output of spacecraft transmitters. This param- 
eter was chosen because it is critical in a space mission 
and it is generally d a c u l t  to achieve. 
1. Data Analysis 
Table B-1 is a listing of all readily available spacecraft 
transmitter power outputs. It is not an exhaustive listing 
of spacecraft missions and only reflects data that were 
easily available. Only minimum effort was made to qualify 
any of the data. All examples received are listed, although 
all have not proved to be useful examples for the purpose 
outlined above. The main cause for this lack of useful- 
ness is that the number of samples is too small to permit 
strong inferences to be made. A second problem in the 
data analysis is that the true or complete strategies that 
were applied in the transmitter developments were not 
available during data collection. 
The data have been plotted individually in cumulated 
histograms on which manual fits were estimated. These 
fitted curves were then differentiated to obtain estimated 
probability density functions. This procedure was found 
most useful for the small number of samples available 
where histograms display the characteristic of noise. 
While some of the strategies were known, there ap- 
pear to be implied or unstated strategies in the examples. 
In some instances, these implied strategies cause prob- 
lems in identifying the individual contribution to the 
effect. Only the total strategy can be estimated because 
there are unlimited ways of breaking the total strategy 
into individual strategies. (In the problem described in 
the body of this report, the strategies were arbitrarily 
chosen.) 
II. Ranger-Mariner II 
Both the Ranger and Mariner ZZ missions used essen- 
tially the same transmitter. This transmitter was one of 
the early space transmitter that was required to dem- 
onstrate many factors in a relatively new environment. 
Because much of the data on the power output of the 
transmitter has been lost in the intervening time since 
the missions, strong inferences cannot be made. How- 
ever, the parameter transmitter power output was not a 
dominant consideration and was not regarded significant 
to the analysis. 
The Ranger-Mariner IZ used an L-band cavity trans- 
mitter with a target power output of 3 W. A power output 
of 3 W at the L-band frequency was then weil within 
the state-of-the-art. Dominant characteristics considered 
of greater importance were: bandwidth, lifetime, thermal 
control, and quality control as related to reliability. 
The Ranger-Mariner ZZ transmitter was developed at 
JPL. Although the analysis presented in this report is 
still applicable under these circumstances (if one con- 
siders suborganizations as the contractor), the situation 
potentially introduces a difficult complication. For ex- 
ample, it was impossible to determine whether the de- 
signer established the specifkation, or whether the design 
preceded the specification. For the production models 
that the data represent, a fixed price contract was placed 
for fabrication and cursory testing to JPL drawings and 
procedures. Pretested tubes were supplied to the vendor, 
and final tests and adjustments were made at JPL. The 
final established specification was 2.5 W. 
The strategies applied to either the designer or the 
vendor cannot be determined. It was difficult to deter- 
mine the personal interests of the designer or the vendor 
in regard to the transmitter power output because this 
parameter was not the dominant specification. There- 
fore, no strong inference can be drawn from inspection 
of the data in Fig. B-1. 
111. Mariner IV-Mariner V 
Surplus hardware from Mariner ZV was used on 
Mariner V; therefore both Mariners ZV and V are con- 
sidered to have used the same hardware population. 
By the time the Mariner ZV mission was defined, pro- 
cedures for telecommunication link performance had 
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Mariner IV, V 
transponder 
(cavity1 
Mariner IV, V 
TWT amplifier 
Mariner 69 TWT 
amplifier 
Apollo IMSC) 
transponder 
Apollo (MSKI 
transponder 
Lunar Orbiter 
TWT amplifier 
Pioneer 
transponder 
Ranger-Mariner II 
transponder 
- 
Power 
Wb 
11.35 
11.85 
11.6 
10.8 
11.8 
11.75 
12.65 
10.95 
12.2 
11.1 
11.35 
1 1.4 
11.6 
11.6 
10.9 
11.1 
11.35 
13.3 
12.6 
11.8 
DUtpUt, 
- 
- 
Power 
W 
11.48 
1 1.75 
13.2 
JUtpUt, 
- 
- 
Power 
W 
19.74 
19.0 
19.2 
20.42 
DUtpUt, 
- 
- 
Power 
output, 
W 
12.2 
1 1.9 
11.9 
11.8 
12.2 
- 
- 
Mission 
- 
A501 
A502 
L205 
- 
Hission 
- 
P-6 
P-7 
P- 8 
- 
Hission 
A501 
A502 
A503 
A504 
- 
Power 
wtput 
W 
9.3 
8.3 
9.3 
- 
Serial 
number 
Serial 
lumber 
Power 
output, 
WC 
18.9 
18.7 
19.0 
19.25 
19.65 
19.3 
19.7 
20.6 
20.0 
18.4 
18.42 
19.92 
19.45 
20.75 
- 
Serial 
number 
282 
284 
285 
286 
289 
293 
296 
297 
312 
315 
316 
317 
3 20 
323 
Mission Mission 
LO1 
LO2 
LO3 
LO4 
LO5 
R- 1 
R-2 
R-3 
R-4 
R-5 
R-6 
R-7 
R-8 
R-9 
M-1 
M-2 
c110 
C119 
C123 
C130 
C131 
9.4 
6.17 
6.91 
6.91 
6.1 6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
7 
10 
12 
13 
15 
16 
18 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
BTelemetered value measured a t  low gain antenna monitor. 
bNominal bench values measured by vendor. 
CWorst-case over environment and voltage of bench values measured by vendor. 
been firmly established. In the preliminary mission defi- 
nition, two dominant characteristics of the transmitter 
were indicated: 
A cavity amplifier was developed at JPL for the 
Mariner program. Two major difficulties were identified 
in a late stage of the development. One problem was that 
a mechanical design choice in the final models made it 
difficult to obtain 10 W from the transmitters. A second 
problem was that life tests indicated a serious degrada- 
tion of power with time. Major remedial action was under- 
taken to guarantee integrity of the Mariner program. 
(1) Power output greater than 10 W at S-band for 
greater than 6000 h. 
(2) A raw power constraint requiring 30% efficiency. 
A reexamination of the availability of raw power 
showed that 30% efficiency was no longer required. This 
fact permitted consideration of a TWT amplifier that 
had demonstrated good lifetime characteristics. Subse- 
quently, an alternate Mariner IV design was developed 
to include implementation of the TWT amplifier. 
A cavity amplifier was determined to be the best type 
of power amplifier to meet these requirements. Ampli- 
trons, klystrons, and traveling-wave tube (TWT) ampli- 
fiers were also considered but were discarded for various 
reasons. 
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POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-1 . Ranger-Mariner II transponder-power output, cumulated histogram, 
and estimated probability density function 
~ 10 1 
POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-2. Mariner 1V transponder (cavity)--power output, cumulated histogram, 
and estimated probability density function 
1.2 
I .O 
(8 
1.2 
1 
1 .o 
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Corrective mechanical measures eliminated the power 
output problem in the cavity amplifier, but power degra- 
dation continued to be a problem. This problem was 
partially rectified when the filament voltage was reduced, 
thereby lowering the power output. Final link analysis 
revealed that the resulting power output would accom- 
modate encounter only if the cavity amplifier use was 
restricted to certain phases of the mission. The resulting 
design was a hybrid that included one cavity amplifier 
and one TWT amplifier. 
The launch phase of the mission was accomplished 
with the cavity amplifier because it could survive the low 
pressure breakdown region. Later, the system was 
switched to the TWT amplifier so that the life of the 
cavity amplifier could be conserved for an emergency 
mode during encounter. (The preceding discussion indi- 
cates the strong surveillance given the Mariner trans- 
mitter problem.) 
TWT amplifiers were not put in bonded stock unless 
they had demonstrated more than 11 W. For this reason, 
the target power output for the design had been 11.5 W. 
There are two main selection and adjustment processes 
on the TWT amplifier assembly that can be made to 
change the basic power output of the tube by modest 
amounts. The focusing magnets can be restacked and 
the output matching stub can be changed. Both of these 
adjustments can be made inexpensively. Apparently, at- 
tention was only given to these adjustments if the power 
was below 11.8 W. 
The cumulated histogram of the TWT amplifiers is 
presented in Fig. B-3. Strong inferences can be made 
from these data because a large number of samples were 
used in the analysis. 
Figure B-3 also shows the fitted distribution function 
and the fitted probability density function. These are 
distinctive and unusual functions, and from the analysis A. Mariner Cavity Amplifier Data 
presented in this report, it can be surmised that the 
probability density function must arise from a mixed or 
composite strategy as shown in Fig. B-4a. This strategy 
may be broken up in an unlimited number of ways; how- 
ever, it that the strategy shown in Fig. B-4b is a 
reasonable choice. This anticipated strategy is obtained 
through an inverse process as given in Section VIII. 
The Mariner cavity amplifier specification was subse- 
quently reduced from the original 10-W minimum to a 
6-W minimum. Figure B-2 shows the cumulated histogram 
of the delivered units. The fitted data follow closely that 
which would be expected from what was described pre- 
viously as state-of-the-art improvement (Section IX-A-4). 
There is some hint of a mixed strategy of state-of-the-art 
improvement with surveillance centered at about 8 W 
(Section IX-B-3 and Fig. 52 for k, = 5). However, with 
only five samples, strong inferences cannot be made. It 
appears that the surveillance influence should be stronger 
because so much attention was given to the Mariner N 
cavity amplifier problem. However, it was difficult to 
recognize the need for action and to implement timely 
follow-up procedures that would have guaranteed the 
effectiveness of the corrective action. This explanation 
is satisfactory only for the cavity amplser; however, if 
the complete mission is under consideration, it should be 
stated that the TWT amplifier did satisfy the specifica- 
tion in response to the surveillance given. 
There is a distinct breaking point at 11.85 W that is 
suspected to be the point at which there is strong internal 
contractor management surveillance and procedural in- 
fluence to leave the unit alone. However, there seems to 
be internal contractor management surveillance that in- 
creases linearly as the power output falls below 11.85 W. 
The difference between 11.85 W and the 11.5-W target 
value seems to be about the accuracy at which the power 
can be measured. In addition to the assumed surveillance 
function, there seems to be a modest cost that increases 
with output power and is referred to as development 
cost. Because the TWT amplifier was assumed to be an 
off -the-shelf item, “development cost” may be a misnomer. 
B. Mariner Traveling-Wave Tube Amplifier 
The TWT amplifier selected for the Mariner mission 
had already been developed for the Surveyor program 
and had been subjected to some lifetime tests. By the 
time orders were placed, this amplifier was considered 
an off -the-shelf item. 
The Mariner 69 radio frequency subsystem (RFS), which 
includes the telecommunication radio and microwave 
components, was placed with a single system contractor. 
This contract included incentives on several parameters 
to assure performance of certain important functions of 
the subsystem. 
The Surveyor specification was identical to the original 
Mariner specification (i.e., 10-W minimum); however, 
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POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-3. Mariner IV TWT amplifier-power output, cumulated histogram, 
and estimated probability density function 
-0.6 
DEVELOPMENT COST I 
I 
13 14 15 16 
POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-4. Anticipated strategy for the Mariner TWT amplifier power output: (a) composite strategy; 
(b) anticipated components for the overall strategy 
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Negotiations with the system contractor resulted in 
incentives on the total RF power delivered to the high 
gain antenna terminals and on the total circuit losses 
between the transmitter and the high gain antenna termi- 
nals. These incentives were as follows: 
~ ~ 
Power output, dBm Award 
> 41.95 
< 41.95 
$12,500 
None 
Circuit losses, dB Award 
< 0.95 
< 1.40 
> 1.40 
$ 9,375 
$ 1,875 
None 
Implementation of the subsystem was accomplished 
through a second group of contracts. Some of these con- 
tracts included incentives applied by the system contractor 
with strong insistence by JPL. In the particular param- 
eter of interest here, the TWT amplifiers were subcon- 
tracted on an incentive schedule as follows: 
Power output, W Award 
18.3 (minimum) None 
< 19.4 None 
> 19.4 $1000/TWT amplifier 
> 19.4 Additional $1000/ 
(less than 68 W raw 
power required) 
TWT ampwer 
These parameters were to be worst-case values under 
conditions of voltage variations and environmental con- 
ditions. To meet these conditions, an incentive was given 
and the price was increased by about 50%. This increase 
was requested so that the amplifiers could be given 
greater care and so a greater number of parts for adjust- 
ments could be purchased. 
Table B-2 is a listing of the power outputs of the 
delivered TWT amplifiers. The power outputs are plotted 
in cumulated histograms with fitted distribution and 
density functions in Figs. B-5 to B-7. 
Although the incentives were specified in the contract, 
the test procedures were negotiated during the execution 
Serial 
number 
282 
284 
285 
286 
289 
293 
296 
297 
31 2 
315 
31 6 
317 
320 
323 
Conditional 
worst-case 
power 
Nominal Worst-case 
power power 
output, w output, w output, wa 
22.1 
21.5 
22.03 
22.38 
22.65 
23.81 
22.75 
23.4 
22.93 
22.90 
22.1 0 
23.50 
22.24 
24.00 
18.9 
18.7 
19.0 
19.25 
19.65 
19.3 
19.7 
20.6 
20.0 
18.4 
18.42 
19.92 
19.45 
20.75 
19.5 
20.15 
19.75 
20.1 5 
20.3 
20.5 
20.4 
21.8 
20.1 
b -
19.3 
21.30 
20.15 
22.8 
aConditional worst-case dola are taken without a simulated power supply source 
resistance. 
bNo data available. 
of the contract. These negotiations began about nine 
months before the tests began and continued through 
the early phase of the tests. The procedures to which the 
TWT amplifiers were being tested included provisions to 
compensate for the effects of flight on the internal im- 
pedance of the power supply for the TWT amplifier. 
(This test realistically represents the flight configuration.) 
Plots of the nominal power output of the delivered 
TWT amplifiers are shown in Fig. B-5. This figure con- 
tains data that resulted from the methods that the sub- 
contractor used in preparing to meet the worst-case tests; 
it is important to consider these methods because the 
TWT ampaers were not modified to compensate for 
the worst-case test results. These curves closely resemble 
that of Section IX-A-1, which had a triangular incentive 
award. Of course, this is the result of subcontractor 
internal strategies and might be interpreted as either in- 
centive or surveillance. It is apparent that the subcon- 
tractor is trying actively to pursue the award for high 
power output and low raw power requirements. Slight 
influence is also apparent for some linear development 
costs. 
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1.2 
POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-5. Mariner VI and VI/ TWT amplifier-nominal power output, cumulated histogram, and 
estimated probability density function 
POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-6. Mariner VI and VI/ TWT amplifier-worst-case power output, cumulated histogram, and 
estimated probability density function 
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1.2 I I 
Fig. B-7. Mariner VI and VI1 TWT amplifier-power output, cumulated histogram, and estimated 
probability density function (with resistor modification) 
Plots of the worst-case power output of the delivered 
TWT amplifiers are shown in Fig. B-6. The results indi- 
cate a complete indifference to the incentive award if 
the results are taken at face value. This indifference 
could be caused by the fact that there is no rework 
performed after the worst-case tests and that the worst- 
case conditions are the dominant factors in the results, 
completely nullifying some of the influence of the pre- 
vious design effort. 
All the units met the minimum specification (otherwise 
they would have been undeliverable), and only half the 
units met the incentive award criterion. Although the in- 
centive award had no apparent effect (as indicated by 
the resulting probability density function of the hard- 
ware parameter), the incentive award did motivate the 
subcontractor to pursue the devious path of renegotia- 
tion. Without concurrence of JPL, the subcontractor was 
subsequently relieved (by the system contractor) of the 
requirement to compensate for the impedance of the TWT 
amplifier power supply. The result of this renegotiation 
completely negated the purpose of the incentive award 
and allowed the incentive to be paid on all but two of 
the delivered tubes. 
Plots of the modified worst-case power output (relaxed 
test procedure) are shown in Fig. B-7. There is small 
difference in the shape of the curves in Fig. B-7 from 
that of the worst-case curves. They in fact look very 
similar to that of the Mariner IV TWT amplifiers, al- 
though the tests of the Mariner IV TWT amplifiers were 
not based on worst-case conditions. 
V. A p o h  Manned Spacecraft Center 
A cumulated histogram of the ApoZZo Manned Space- 
craft Center (MSC) transponder power output is shown 
in Fig. B-8. Because so few samples were available, the 
inference was weak, but it does appear to be a triangular 
probability density function sloping upward toward the 
low value of 11.0 W from 14.3 W. There was a minimum 
specification on this transponder of 11.2 W with no in- 
centive offered. The assumed curve would indicate a 
linear development cost function. 
The TWT amplifier used in this transponder was the 
same type as used on Mariner IV. Since exact details of 
the Apollo (MSC) measurements are not known and 
because there are so few samples, no attempt will be 
made to determine if they came from the same population. 
VI. Apollo Marshall Space Flight Center 
A cumulated histogram of the ApoZZo Marshall Space 
Flight Center (MSFC) transponder power output is 
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1.2 
0 
I 
11 13 14 15 
POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-8. Apollo (MSC) transponder-power output, cumulated histogram, and 
estimated probability density function 
POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-9. Apollo (MSFC) transponder-power output, cumulated histogram, and 
estimated probability density function 
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shown in Fig. B-9. The weakness of the inference is 
similar to that in the Apollo MSC data. A triangular 
probability density function sloping upward toward 
18.8 W from 21.0 W might be reasonable. There was a 
minimum specification on this transponder of 15 W with 
no incentive offered. The assumed curve would indicate 
an inferred minimum specification of 18.8 W and a linear 
development cost function. 
Although it is not clearly indicated in the cumulated 
histogram, it is quite possible that a considerable amount 
of surveillance in the same form as given in Section IX-B-3 
may have actually been applied during the course of the 
development program of this transponder. This possi- 
bility can also be said for the Apollo MSC program. 
A cumulated histogram of the Lunar Orbiter TWT 
amplifiers is shown in Fig, B-10. The small number of 
samples makes the inference weak; however, fitted curves 
are drawn. There was a specification of 10, +3.0 -0.0 W 
for this function, but no incentive was included. How- 
ever, load requirements were included. A triangular 
probability density function corresponding to a linear de- 
velopment cost seems to fit reasonably. The specification 
seems to have little influence on the shape of the curve. 
Data were also available for the transponder power 
output that differs from the TWT amplifier power out- 
put because of interconnections and filters that are in- 
cluded. A cumulated histogram for this function is 
shown in Fig. B-11. This function had a 2.98-W minimum 
specification over a temperature range of 35445°F. Load 
requirements were also included. The resulting fitted 
probability density function is a triangular one that is 
reversed in slope from that of the TWT ampmer. This 
seems to be a good example of the selective process the 
contractor has available to adjust the probability density 
function. 
IB. eer 
A cumulated histogram of the Pioneer 6, 7 ,  and 8 
transmitters is shown in Fig. B-12. A fit could not be 
attempted because the number of samples was too small. 
In all of the examples cited, the predominant influence 
on the resultant probability density functions appeared 
to be a linear development cost. In one transmitter ex- 
ample (for which incentives were applied to the con- 
tract), there was no perceptible effect on the results. 
There was only subtle hint of any effect of a surveillance 
function. Either the k d  to k, ratio is extremely high or 
the function as defined is not the one used. Perhaps the 
surveillance function is more coincidental to the speci- 
fication than was suspected. In one of the examples, there 
seems to be a clear-cut correspondence to that which was 
expected from the strategies. Nothing was found to con- 
tradict the theory presented in the body of this report. 
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POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-10. Lunar Orbiter TWT amplifier-power output, cumulated histogram, and 
estimated probability density function 
1.2 
POWER OUTPUT, W 
Fig. B-11. Lunar Orbiter transponder-power output, 
cumulated histogram, and estimated probability density 
function 
Fig. 6-1 2. Pioneer transponder-power output 
cumulated histogram 
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A specification limit 
a specification limit 
B specification limit 
b computed limit for the desired probability 
density function 
C, arbitrary constant 
C, arbitrary constant 
C, expected cost 
C(x)  cost to contractor for delivering a hardware 
parameter of x 
expected net profit or payoff 
expected value of function f (x )  
expected net profit or payoff 
E 
E[ f ( x ) ]  
E [ N ( x ) ]  
F integrand of I 
F* integrand of I* 
f ( x )  dummy weighting function 
f l ( x )  probability density function of target loca- 
tion 
Gi ith constraint function 
g [ p ( x ) ]  functional of p ( x )  related to cost 
I integral (with no constraints) to be maxi- 
mized (or minimized) with the techniques 
of the calculus of variations 
integral (with integral constraints) to be 
maximized (or minimized) with the tech- 
niques of the calculus of variations 
I* 
i positive integer 
i positive integer 
K a constant 
k 
k, cost coefficient 
k,, 
kd state-of-the-art development cost coefficient 
k, incentive award coefficient 
k, surveillance coefficient 
cost factor used to represent k, and k d  
critical value of cost coefficient 
N positive integer 
N ( x )  net profit for delivering a hardware param- 
eter of x 
P Markov transition matrix 
Pb 
P, 
p ( x )  
baseline for moddying p(x) when necessary 
the probability of detecting a target 
probability density function of delivering a 
hardware parameter of x, the desired prob- 
ability density function 
po(x) natural probability density function 
pi(x) 
p*(x )  
probability density function of the ith item 
modified desired probability density func- 
tion 
Q arbitrary constant 
R 
R(x) 
bounded region of an integral 
reward for delivering a hardware param- 
eter of x 
r(x) normalized reward function 
S ( x )  surveillance function for an observed hard- 
ware parameter of x 
U ( p )  unit step function 
~ ( x )  mixed strategic function 
X 
x 
xo nominal value of x 
some specific (or computed) value of x 
value of a hardware parameter 
x1 
Ak I k , - k a [  
some specific value of x 
A Lagrange multiplier 
A; 
cf, 
Lagrange multiplier for the ith constraint 
total allocated resource of a search effort 
cp(x) distribution of search effort 
cp*(x) optimum distribution of search effort 
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